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INDIVIDUAL CARBON EMISSIONS:
THE LoW-HANGING FRUIT

Michael P. Vandenbergh*

Jack Barkenbus**
Jonathan Gilligan***
The individual and household sector generates roughly 30 to 40 percent of
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and is a potential source of prompt and large
emissions reductions. Yet the assumption that only extensive government regulation will generate substantial reductions from the sector is a barrier to change,
particularly in a political environment hostile to regulation. This Article demonstrates
that prompt and large reductions can be achieved without relying predominantly
on regulatory measures. The Article identifies seven "low-hanging fruit:" actions
that have the potential to achieve large reductions at less than half the cost of the
leading current federal legislation, require limited up-front government expenditures, generate net savings for the individual, and do not confront other barriers.
The seven actions discussed in this Article not only meet these criteria, but also will
generate roughly 150 million tons in emissions reductions and several billion dollars
in net social savings. The Article concludes that the actions identified here are only
a beginning, and it identifies changes that will be necessary by policymakers and
academicians if these and other low-hangingfruit are to be picked.
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INTRODUCTION

An emerging consensus suggests that reducing the risks of catastrophic

climate change will require leveling off greenhouse gas emissions in the near
term and reductions of 60 to 80 percent from present levels by 2050.' Reductions at these levels are all the more daunting in the face of projections
1. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne K. Steinemann, The Carbon-NeutralIndividual,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1675 (2007). Entities that have adopted such targets include roughly
two dozen corporations that are members of the U.S. Climate Action Partnership. See, e.g.,
U.S. CLIMATE ACTION PARTNERSHIP, A CALL FOR ACTION: CONSENSUS PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE U.S. CLIMATE ACTION PARTNERSHIP: A BUSINESS AND NGO

PARTNERSHIP 3-7 (2007), available at http://us-cap.org/USCAPCallForAction.pdf (setting shortand long-term goals); Immediate Actions to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions Within Florida,
Exec. Order No. 07-127 (2007), available at http://www.flgov.com/pdfs/orders/07-127-emissions.pdf
(setting a long-term goal of 80 percent reductions from 1990 levels by 2050).
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that global emissions will grow by roughly 50 percent by 20302 and double
by 2050.' If the consensus about the speed and magnitude of the required
emissions reductions proves to be accurate, the public and private response
cannot afford to overlook any major sources. Doing so will increase the costs
of emissions reductions and may make it impossible to achieve short- and
long-term targets.
This Article demonstrates that the individual and household sector
represents an enormous and largely untapped source of prompt, low-cost
emissions reductions. Carbon dioxide (CO 2) is by far the most important

greenhouse gas, 4 and recent scholarship has demonstrated that individual and
household emissions comprise roughly 30 to 40 percent of the CO emissions
from the United States.5 In theory, the individual and household sector
thus represents a major target of opportunity for policymakers.
Despite the potential for large, low-cost reductions from the individual
and household sector, most federal, state, and local climate change measures
focus directly on large industrial sources and will reduce individual and
household emissions only indirectly. For example, the leading cap-and-trade
legislation in Congress includes a 10,000 metric ton threshold-orders of
magnitude higher than the several tons per year emitted by the average U.S.
household.6 Regional and state trading programs have adopted or proposed
similar regulatory and reporting thresholds.7 These downstream cap-andtrade programs (for example, caps on emissions from electric generating
facilities) will reduce emissions from individuals and households indirectly
by increasing the price of energy and consumer goods.8 Similarly, upstream
2. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK
2007, at 5 (May 2007), availableat http://eia.doe.gov/oiaf/archive/ieo07/pdf/0484(2007).pdf (projecting a
57 percent increase in global emissions in 2030) [hereinafter EIA, OUTLOOK 2007].
3. See Stephen Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for
the Next 50 Years With CurrentTechnologies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 968-69 (2004) (projecting an increase
from seven to fourteen gigatons of carbon between 2004 and 2054).
4.
EIA, OUTLOOK 2007, supra note 2, at 14.
5. See discussion infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
6.
See America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. §§ 4(7), 1102(1)
(introduced by Sens. Lieberman and Warner) (defining "covered facilities" and "affected facilities").
This legislation defines carbon dioxide equivalents to mean "the quantity of the greenhouse gas that
the Administrator determines makes the same contribution to global warming as 1 metric ton of
carbon dioxide." Id. § 1(4); see also Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 1, at 1692-94 (finding
that individuals on average accounted for over 14,000 pounds of carbon dioxide (CO) emissions in 2000).
7. See, e.g., Nancy Netherton, Washington State Agencies Recommend Strategies to Reduce
Greenhouse Emissions, DAILY ENV'T, Dec. 31, 2007, at A-6 (noting new Washington regulations
proposing a 25,000 metric ton threshold for greenhouse gas emissions reporting).

8.

See

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUE BRIEF, TRADE-OFFS IN

ALLOCATING ALLOWANCES FOR CO, EMISSIONS 1 (Apr. 25, 2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/80xx/doc8027/04-25-Cap-Trade.pdf.
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cap-and-trade programs (for example, caps on fossil fuel imports and
extraction) also will reduce individual and household emissions indirectly
by increasing prices.9 Efficiency standards imposed on the manufacturers
of motor vehicles, appliances, and other consumer goods also will reduce
emissions from consumers who buy the more efficient goods."0
Although these indirect measures will reduce individual and household
emissions, they will leave enormous potential reductions on the table. To
illustrate, cap-and-trade-based increases in energy prices will influence
behavior, but research suggests that large price increases may be necessary
to induce meaningful reductions in energy consumption.' Further, recent
increases in gas prices have had modest effects on behavior, 2 and "energy
invisibility" and other constraints limit household responses to electricity
price increases.'" Efficiency mandates bypass these shortcomings to some
extent, but the potential for emissions reductions from efficiency mandates
is limited by the extent to which industry lobbying blocks or delays the mandates and by the extent to which consumers opt for more efficient goods. 4
If individuals and households comprise a third or more of all emissions,
and indirect measures leave emissions reductions on the table, why do so few
policies target these emissions directly? One possibility is the widespread
9.
Upstream cap-and-trade schemes regulate the importation or production of the regulated
substance, whereas downstream schemes regulate the entities that release the regulated substance.
See America's Climate Security Act of 2007 § 4(7)(A), (B).
10.
See, e.g., Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks Model Years 2008-2011, 71
Fed. Reg. 17,566 (Apr. 6, 2006) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 533, 537) (mandating increased
fuel economy for motor vehicles); Central Air Conditioners and Heat Pumps Energy Conservation
Standards, 10 C.F.R. § 430 (2007) (mandating increased efficiency for air conditioners and heat pumps).
11.
See Paul C. Stem, Information, Incentives, and Proenvironmental Consumer Behavior, 22 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 461, 469 (1999). See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY EFFICIENCY
IN BUILDINGS: BEHAVIORAL ISSUES 9-10, 40 (Paul C. Stem ed., 1985) [hereinafter NRC, BEHAVIORAL
ISSUES] (discussing influences on energy efficiency behaviors).
12.
See Ana Campoy, Americans Start to Curb Their Thirst for Gasoline, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3,
2008, at A-i; Jonathan E. Hughes et al., Evidence of a Shift in the Short-Run Price Elasticity of Gasoline
Demand (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. UCD-ITS-RR-06-16, 2006), available
at http://pubs.its.ucdavis.edu/publicationdetail.php?id= 1050.
13.
"Energy invisibility" refers to the absence of awareness of the sources of residential energy
consumption. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY USE: THE HUMAN DIMENSION 36-42
(Paul C. Stem & Elliot Aronson eds., 1984) [hereinafter NRC, HUMAN DIMENSION].
14.
See, e.g., Christopher Conkey & Stephen Power, Lobbyists Push for Suy Over Fuel-Economy
Rules, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2008, at A9 (noting auto maker lobbying against stringent fueleconomy rules). Steep discount rates and similar phenomena reduce consumer uptake of many
energy efficient goods.
See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DECISION MAKING FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PRIORITIES 78-81 (Garry D.
Brewer & Paul C. Stem eds., 2005) [hereinafter NRC, DECISION MAKING]. In addition, roughly
one-sixth of the population may lack the financial resources needed to take advantage of many
efficient goods that require large up-front expenditures. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Brooke
Ackerly, Climate Change: The Equity Problem, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 53, 61 (2008).
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belief that only extensive government regulation will generate large, prompt
reductions in individual and household emissions." If extensive government
regulation is required, the lack of political support for such measures makes
direct emissions reductions from individuals and households a nonstarter in
the current political environment. 6
In this Article, we challenge the view that only extensive government
regulation will generate prompt, large emissions reductions from individuals
and households. We focus on one of the most important potential reasons
why policymakers at the federal, state, and local levels may be directing
laws and policies in other directions: a lack of awareness of the emissions
reductions that are available at levels of political and economic cost that
compare favorably to those of measures directed at other sources. We argue
that information provision may be an effective and politically viable measure
to reduce individual and household emissions in some cases, and in other
cases combinations of information provision, economic incentives, and
modest legal requirements may succeed, even in the antiregulatory environment prevailing in the United States.'7 Although in this Article we focus
on the extent to which individual and household emissions represent lowhanging fruit in the United States, we note that these opportunities are
global. Individuals and households comprise comparable shares of national
emissions in other developed countries, and a recent report concludes that
15.
See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Only by Requiring lifestyle Change, Not Suggesting It, 24 ENVTL.
F. 48 (2007) (stating that "individuals and households will not achieve substantial, near term
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions absent extensive government regulation").
16.
Despite the drumbeat of media reports warning of arctic ice loss, see, e.g., 'Arctic is
Screaming' Scientists Say: Quickened Melting Threatens Sea Ice, TENNESSEAN, Dec. 12, 2007, at 1A
(noting a recent projection that summer time arctic sea ice may disappear by 2013), and other
indicators that climate change is accelerating, public support for regulation of individual behavior is
lacking. Recent polling suggests generalized concern about climate change, but it ranks seventh
among voters' priorities, well behind competing concerns such as high gas prices and economic
growth. See Hart/Newhouse Research Companies, Study No. 6073 (June 2007), available at
http://online.wsj.conpublic/resources/documents/0607-wsj-nbc-polldoc-6pm.rtf.pdf (discussing findings
of a survey conducted on behalf of NBC News and the Wall Street Journal based on telephone
interviews with a national adult sample of 1,008). Efforts to regulate individual behavior directly
have been rare, perhaps because past efforts such as lowering speed limits have generated a swift,
ferocious response. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as
Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 555-56 (2004) (noting
the public response both to speed limit reductions in Texas as well as ozone precursor emissions from
backyard grilling in California).
17.
See generally Editorial, T.R.? He's No T.R., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007, at 4.11.
18.
See, e.g., ENVr. AUDIT COMM., U.K. HOUSE OF COMMONS, PERSONAL CARBON TRADING:
FIFTH REPORT OF SESSION 2007-08, at 8-9 (2008), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmenvaud/565/565.pdf (noting the importance of household emissions
in the United Kingdom and that the household share accounts for roughly 40 percent of its
carbon emissions); see also U.K. Enviro Minister Backs Personal Carbon Quotas, GREENWIRE,
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residential emissions may represent one of the top two global opportunities
for low-cost CO 2 emissions reductions.1 9
After briefly identifying the criteria for emissions reductions measures
to serve as a viable addition to the current policy mix, we examine seven
potential low-hanging fruit reductions. These are by no means all of the
low-hanging fruit opportunities, but these seven actions have the potential
to generate prompt, large reductions at lower cost than many of the measures
adopted or proposed to date. They further serve as examples of the types
of additional measures that an intensive research and policy effort could
identify and address."
We demonstrate that viable measures directed at these emissions
sources can generate large emissions reductions quickly and cheaply. In fact,
if started in 2009 the limited set of low-hanging fruit measures outlined in
this Article can reasonably be expected to generate a reduction in annual
emissions in the neighborhood of 150 million short tons of CO2 by 2014.21
The magnitude of this reduction compares favorably to a number of
benchmarks, both in terms of the volume and the speed by which the
reductions can be accomplished. For example, these reductions constitute
47.7 percent of the annual CO 2 now emitted by petroleum refiners in
the United States and almost three times the annual CO 2 emissions by the
aluminum industry.22 Put another way, these savings are the equivalent of
removing 26 million automobiles from the road or eliminating the need for
54 large power plants." The low-hanging fruit emissions reductions also
July 20, 2006, http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2006/07/20/9(noting that the share
comprised by the individual and household emissions sector in the United Kingdom is
44 percent).
19.
See FLORIAN BRESSAND ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., CURBING GLOBAL ENERGY
DEMAND GROWTH: THE ENERGY PRODUCTIVITY OPPORTUNITY 57 (2007).

20.
For this analysis, we focus on emissions from those behaviors that are under the
substantial, direct control of individuals and thus may be most affected by laws and policies targeted
at this source category. See Paul C. Stem et al., Strategies for Setting Research Priorities, in NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTALLY SIGNIFICANT CONSUMPTION: RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

124, 133 (Paul C. Stem et al. eds., 1997) (concluding that "[olne useful strategy is to begin with
possible policy interventions" when analyzing the sources of pollution).
21.
See infra note 64.
22.
MARK SCHIPPER, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, No. DOE/EIA-0573, ENERGY-RELATED
CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS IN U.S. MANUFACTURING 4 tbl.1 (2005).

23.

The average automobile in the U.S. emits 11,470 pounds of CO, or 5.735 tons per year.

See

ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, UNIT CONVERSIONS, EMISSIONS FACTORS, AND OTHER REFERENCE
DATA 6 (2004) thereinafter, EPA, UNIT CONVERSIONS]. Dividing the projected savings of 150

million tons by 5.735 tons per year yields roughly 26 million vehicles. Further, the average power
plant emits 0.696 tons of CO per megawatt hour. Id. at 7. On average, it supplies 4 million
megawatt hours per year. Id. Hence, on an annual basis it emits 2.784 million tons of CO.
Dividing 2.784 million ton total into 150 million tons yields 54 power plants. There are nearly 500
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could constitute a large portion of one of the global "stabilization wedges"
proposed by Pacala and Socolow.24 They could account for more than half
of the 2012 emissions reductions required by the leading federal legislative
proposal (the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act) 25 and for 75
percent of the 2020 emissions reductions projected to be achieved by the
new Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in the Energy
Independence & Security Act of 2007.26
In addition to large, prompt reductions, the low-hanging fruit measures
have the prospect of achieving these reductions at far lower cost than the
average per-ton carbon reduction cost of leading proposed measures. For
example, a recent estimate of the marginal cost of the Lieberman-Warner
Bill is roughly $20 per ton in 2015, increasing to over $100 per ton by
2050.27 In contrast, although we have not attempted to conduct a thorough

cost analysis, the low-hanging fruit measures all have a reasonable prospect
of generating net negative abatement costs-social savings, not costs-in

major power plants (those that generate at least 2 million megawatt hours of electricity annually)
in the U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Energy, Annual Electric Utility Data-EIA 906/920
DataFile, Dec. 2007, available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/ eia906-920.html.
Thus, the 54-plant-reduction represents 10 percent of the current total.
24.
See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 3, at 969. The importance of accounting for the low
probability but high consequence climate change effects that may occur when atmospheric CO,
concentrations exceed target levels such as 450-550 parts per million is also a topic of increasing
interest in the economics literature. See, e.g., Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of The Stem Review
on the Economics of Climate Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 703, 723-24 (2007) (concluding
that it is important to "confront[ I the issue of what to do about catastrophe insurance against the

possibility of thick-tailed rare disasters").
25.
The Lieberman-Wamer Bill emissions cap for 2012 is set at the 2005 emissions level. See
infra note 222. The total emissions in 2005 were 6,609 million short tons. The Energy Information
Administration projects CO2 emissions to increase by 0.6 percent per year, which would result in a
2012 level of 6,892 million tons, or an increase of 283 million tons. See Revised Energy Outlook:
HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Energy and NaturalRes., 110th Cong. 7, 12 (2008) (testimony of Guy
Caruso, Administrator, Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy); see also
NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CONTRIBUTION OF THE ENERGY BILL (H.R. 6) TO MEETING THE
GLOBAL WARMING POLLUTION REDUCTIONS TARGETS OF S. 2191, at 2-3 (2007).
26.
See The Energy Independence and Security Act, P.L. 110-140, § 102, 121 Stat. 1491,
1498-1500 (2007); see also UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, FACT SHEET: EXTENSIVE BENEFITS
ATTAINED FROM FUEL ECONOMY AGREEMENT 1 (2007).
27.
The estimated cost of abatement measures in the August 2007 framework of the
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act, which provided for 10 percent reductions from 2005
greenhouse gas emissions levels by 2020, was $18 per ton in 2015. A tighter cap would increase
prices to $20 per ton by 2015. Further, costs would increase to $30 to $40 per ton by 2030 and more
than $100 per ton by 2050. See BRIAN C. MURRAY & MARTIN T. ROSS, THE LIEBERMAN-WARNER
AMERICA'S CLIMATE SECURITY ACT: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL ECONOMIC
IMPACT 5-6 (2007). A tighter cap of 15 percent reductions by 2020 was announced on October 18,
2007. Id. at 3-5. Carbon taxes of $5 to $30 per ton by 2025 and $20 to $80 per ton by 2050 are
expected to achieve similar results. See The Final Cut, ECONOMIST, June 2-8, 2007, at 30.
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the billions of dollars." These measures have an out-of-pocket cost to the
government of $1.5 billion dollars, a sum that is less than one percent of
the 2008 federal economic stimulus package 29 and roughly $13 per ton
of CO2 emissions reduced, just over half of the projected total social cost of
the Lieberman-Warner Bill.30 In addition to their relatively low outof-pocket government costs and total social cost, the low-hanging fruit
measures could achieve these reductions at negative abatement costs to
individuals and households; that is, by carrying them out, people could both
cut emissions and save money. 31 Perhaps most important, these low-hanging
fruit measures are only the tip of tie iceberg. Many other low-hanging fruit
measures exist, and other individual and household actions that do not
qualify as low-hanging fruit can generate large emissions reductions and
cost savings.
We did not identify the seven low-hanging fruit discussed in this Article
through a rigorous, systematic process. The limited availability of data on
costs, achievable savings, susceptibility of relevant behaviors to change, and
other factors make a systematic, complete assessment well beyond the scope
of this analysis. Instead, we selected seven candidates for low-hanging fruit
status and assessed each according to our low-hanging fruit criteria. We
selected these candidates heuristically, not by systematically applying our
low-hanging fruit criteria to a larger body of possible actions, and we do not
claim that these seven represent the lowest-hanging fruit. We present them
not as optimal targets but as examples that allow us to illustrate how one
might conduct a low-hanging fruit analysis and to demonstrate the existence
of targets that satisfy our low-hanging fruit criteria. Our conclusion that
considerable emissions reductions are achievable for a small investment
of federal money and at negative net social cost suggests the utility of
conducting more comprehensive research to gather relevant data on the
economic and behavioral aspects of greenhouse gas emissions and to assess

28.

See discussion infra Parts IB, II.B.

29.
See David M. Herszenhom, Congress Votes for a Stimulus of $168 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
8, 2008, at Al.
30.
Our conclusions about low-cost opportunities are consistent with those of a recent
McKinsey report. See JON CREYTS ET AL., MCKNSEY & CO., REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS: How MUCH AT WHAT COST?, at x-xii (2007).
31.
See discussion infra Parts IB, ll.B. Precise cost-benefit analyses of these types of behavior
changes are rare, but one European study puts the range of negative marginal costs (cost savings) for
several of the identified measures at 10 to 90 euros per ton. See VATTENFALL, GLOBAL MAPPING OF
GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT OPPORTUNITIES

www/ccc/ccc/5 77730downl/index.jsp.

(2007), available at http://www.vattenfall.com/
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systematically a wide range of policy actions to identify a more complete
and prioritized set of low-hanging fruit.
We conclude by arguing that although political leadership and increasingly urgent media reports ultimately may shift public opinion in favor of
more aggressive regulatory measures, the steps we identify here could yield
substantial gains long before that happens. These steps may generate nearterm reductions that provide breathing space until the public support for
climate measures catches up with the climate science. They may even
facilitate the shift in public support in the first place. Reductions in these
types of low-hanging fruit emissions also may be necessary to make the
remarkably large emissions reductions required to achieve the long-term

targets. Direct efforts to reduce individual and household emissions are
thus an important addition to the short- and long-term responses to
climate change.
I.

Low-HANGING FRUIT CRITERIA

For this analysis, we assume that policymakers seek measures that
will achieve the short- and long-term emissions reductions targets with
a minimum of political cost. Although a complex mix of factors will
influence the attractiveness of any given remedial measure, we examine
five factors that are likely to have particular salience for policymakers
contemplating measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from individuals and households: (1) Magnitude-the aggregate emissions from the
targeted activity should be of a size that justifies expending time and money
on the measures necessary to reduce the emissions; (2) National Economic
Cost-the aggregate U.S. economic cost of the measures necessary to induce
the emissions reductions should be equal to or less than that of other
measures; (3) Out-of-Pocket Government Cost-the out-of-pocket cost to
the government should not exceed levels that are viable in the current
or reasonably foreseeable future political climate; (4) Personal Economic
Cost-the economic benefits to individuals should equal or exceed the
costs; and (5) Other Personal Barriers-individuals should not face other
barriers to reducing emissions, such as initial capital investment requirements, lack of necessary infrastructure, substantial time demands, or
countervailing personal or social norm-based pressure. Although these
factors are interrelated, they are sufficiently distinct to serve as criteria

for evaluating potential low-hanging fruit opportunities, and we examine
them in more detail below.
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Magnitude

To constitute low-hanging fruit for policymakers, individual and
household actions should include sufficient emissions to justify the
investment of time and money to develop and to implement remedial
measures. Here we demonstrate that individual behavior in the aggregate
accounts for a large portion of the total CO2 emissions from the United
States, and we identify the categories of behavior that contribute the largest share to the individual total.32 We assess the anticipated emissions
reductions from the specific low-hanging fruit actions in Part II.
1.

Aggregate Emissions

As stated at the outset, recent scholarship has demonstrated that
individual and household emissions make up roughly 30 to 40 percent of
U.S. CO2 emissions. Shui Bin and Hadi Dowlatabadi use an input-output
analysis, termed a Consumer Lifestyle Approach, to derive CO, emissions
that they then attribute to direct and indirect consumer activities." They
conclude that direct emissions activities account for 41 percent of total U.S.
CO2 emissions.34 Michael Vandenbergh and Anne Steinemann, using
both top-down and bottom-up analyses, and including only emissions from
activities over which individuals have substantial, direct control, calculate
household CO 2 emissions at 32 percent.35 The different estimates arise
from small methodological differences, such as whether energy losses at
electric utilities are assigned to households.36
Even if actual U.S. individual and household aggregate emissions are
only at the low end of the range, the emissions are nonetheless remarkably
large. For example, if the individual and household share of U.S. emissions
was 32 percent in 2000, it equaled almost 2.1 billion tons, or roughly 8

32.
CO 2 contributes to more than 80 percent of the climate-forcing effect of the most
important anthropogenic greenhouse gases. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 1, at 1680
n. 18 (discussing greenhouse gases).
33.
Shui Bin & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Consumer Lifestyle Approach to U.S. Energy Use and the
Related CO2 Emissions, 33 ENERGY POL'Y 197, 205 (2005) (estimating the individual and household
CO, emissions in 1997 at 41 percent of the U.S. total).
34.
Id.
35.
Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 1, at 1694 (estimating the individual and
household emissions in 2000 at 32 percent of the U.S. total).
36.
One methodological difference is that Bin and Dowlatabadi assign energy losses during
transmission to individuals and households, but Vandenbergh and Steinemann do not. Compare Bin &
Dowlatabadi, supra note 33, at 201, 203, with Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 1,at 1741-45.
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percent of the world total." This 2.1 billion-ton-total exceeded the total
emissions from all industrial sources in the U.S. combined. 8 Aggregate
individual and household emissions also exceeded the total emissions from
all sources in any country other than China.39 In short, the individual and
household sector in the aggregate generates sufficient emissions to warrant

closer scrutiny of the emissions from specific activities and products.
2.

Emissions by Activity or Product

Drawing on data from the Energy Information Administration of the
U.S. Department of Energy, Figure 1 segments emissions by activity or
product." As can be seen, personal automobile usage accounts for a very
large percentage of individual emissions-not surprising given that each
gallon of gasoline burned results in 19.4 pounds of CO2 emissions." When we
look at household activities, home heating and cooling, collectively, stands
out as the largest generator of emissions. Although appliances constitute a
relatively low percentage of the household total, their growth (both in size
and quantity) is of considerable concern."

37.
Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 1,at 1694.
38.
Id. The estimate in Vandenbergh and Steinemann is for the year 2000. Id. In our
analysis, we assume that the individual and household sector accounted for the same aggregate
amount of CO2 emissions in 2005. This estimate is conservative, since U.S. emissions overall
increased during this period. Id. at 1693 (noting that total individual and household emissions are
likely to have increased since the 2000 period); see also Energy Info. Admin, World Carbon Dioxide
Emissions From the Consumption and Flaring of Fossil Fuels, 1980-2005 (Sept. 18, 2007),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/intemational/iealf/tablehlco2.xls [hereinafter World Carbon Dioxide
Emissions] (providing CO, emissions data for 2005 and prior years).
39.
Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 1,at 1695.
40.
See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, TRANSP. ENERGY DATA BOOK 4-2 tbl.4.1, 4-3 tbl.4.2 (2007),
availableat http://cta.oml.gov/data/tedb27/Edition27_- Chapter04.pdf [hereinafter DOE, TRANSPORTATION
DATA BOOK] (providing personal transportation data); Vandenbergh and Steinemann, supra note
1, at 1692-93 (same); U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, 2007 BUILDINGS ENERGY DATA BOOK 3-3 tbl. 3.1.3
(2007) [hereinafter DOE, BUILDINGS DATA BOOK], available at http://www.doe.gov/energyefficiency/
buildings.htm (search for "buildings energy data book") (providing household data).
41.
See EPA, UNIT CONVERSIONS, supra note 23, at 2.
42.
See, e.g., Jack N. Barkenbus, PuttingEnergy Efficiency in a Sustainability Context: The Cold
Facts About Refrigerators, ENVIRONMENT, Oct. 2006, at 10, 13-16 (concluding that although
refrigerators have become more efficient, electricity use by refrigerators "has remained comparable in
absolute terms"); see also Richard York et al., Bridging Environmental Science With Environmental
Policy: Plasticity of Population, Affluence, and Technology, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 18, 20-21 (2002) (noting
the importance of malleability or plasticity of behavior).
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FIGURE 1: COMPOSITION OF U.S. HOUSEHOLD AND TRANSPORTATION

CO, EMISSIONS (PERCENTAGES)

4

mauto~&hghtt ck(5 1%)
aviatcn ma-: Wannt
t
(1%
51

applianree(L2)
wwater heatni~g (6%)

{

=~efrigeration (4%)

1

The significance of each category of individual and household emissions
is apparent when compared to the total emissions from the types of industry
categories that are likely to be subject to carbon emissions requirements at
the federal, state, or local levels. For example, the 6 percent of household
emissions attributed to lighting in Figure 1 constitutes 160 million tons
of emissions per year.43 This figure is roughly equivalent to the combined
emissions of all iron and steel producers and paper mills in the United
States.44 The 12 percent attributable to appliances is roughly equivalent to
the entire U.S. chemical industry emissions.4"
B.

National Economic Cost

Next, to represent low-hanging fruit, the emissions reductions should be
achievable at a lower total national economic cost than competing measures
when accounting for both the cost to the government of inducing a desired
level of emissions reductions and the cost to the nongovernmental parties of
43.
The total pie represents roughly 2.61 billion tons of emissions. See World Carbon
Dioxide Emissions, supra note 38. The percentage break out is as follows: autos/light trucks (1.3 billion
tons); aviation/mass transit (26 million tons); space heating/cooling (520 million tons); appliances
(310 million tons); lighting (160 million tons); water heating (160 million tons); refrigeration (100
million tons). See sources cited supra note 40.
44.
See SCHIPPER, supra note 22.
45.
Id.
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making the reductions. For this Article, we use as a benchmark a recent
estimate that the marginal cost of the year 2015 requirements of the
Lieberman-Wamer Bill now pending in Congress will be roughly $20 per
ton. By the year 2050, the cost is estimated to increase to over $100 per ton.46
Not surprisingly, estimates of the magnitude of the carbon tax necessary to
achieve the necessary emissions reductions are comparable.47
We began our analysis by seeking to identify actions with a national
economic cost of about $10 per ton, or roughly half of the projected per-ton
cost of the Lieberman-Wamer Bill. In short, we began by including in our
low-hanging fruit only individual and household actions for which emissions
reductions reasonably could be expected to be achieved for a cost of $10
per ton or less. This $10 per ton figure not only is half the cost of the
leading federal legislation, but it also compares favorably to the leading
economic analyses of the costs and benefits of carbon emissions reductions.
The Congressional Budget Office has noted48 that the estimated benefit per
ton of CO 2 reduction (the marginal social cost of carbon emissions) along a
trajectory leading to stabilization in the 500 ppm range49 would be between

$8 (the figure proposed
by William Nordhaus) 0 and $30 (the figure proposed
51
by Nicholas Stern).

After an initial analysis, however, it became clear that the cost savings
arising from reduced energy use are so great for each of the seven low-hanging
fruit actions that each of these actions in fact achieves a much more stringent criterion: net social savings, not costs. In short, even if we just account
for the cost of energy at current prices and not for other potential cost
savings (for example, from the benefits of reduced air pollution from
motor vehicles and electric utilities that serve residential customers), the
46.
See Murray & Ross, supra note 27, at 10-12, tbls.A-2 to A-4.
47.
Carbon taxes of $5-$30 per metric ton by 2025 and $20-$80 per metric ton by 2050 are
expected to achieve similar results to the Lieberman-Wamer Bill. See The FinalCut, supra note 27,
at 28 (noting economists estimates of "the carbon price needed to stabilise CO2 concentrations at
550 parts per million").
48.
See Peter R. Orszag, Issues in Climate Change: Presentation for the CBO Director's
Conference on Climate Change 4-5 (Nov. 16, 2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/88xx/
doc8819/11-16-ClimateChangeConf.pdf.
49.
A figure that is in the 500 ppm range is often identified as the target for reducing the risk
of catastrophic climate change. See, e.g., 0. Hoegh-Guldberg et al., Coral Reefs Under Rapid Climate
Change and Ocean Acidification, 318 SCIENCE 1737, 1738 (2007).
50.
See William Nordhaus, The Challenge of Global Warming: Economic Models and
Environmental Policy 160 tbl.V-! (Sept. 11 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/dice-mss-091107-public.pdf.

51.
See NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 304 box 13.3 (2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/A/2/
Chapter- 13Towards-aGoalforClimate-ChangePolicy.pdf.
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savings far exceed the costs. In fact, each of the seven actions achieves
well over $100 million in net social savings.
Although we make assumptions about the national economic cost only
for the low-hanging fruit actions discussed in Part II, we also note here that
a number of recent studies suggest that the costs of a wide range of additional
individual and household emissions reductions may be surprisingly low. For
example, a recent McKinsey report suggests that 11 percent of U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions can be eliminated through steps that would have
negative marginal costs to the parties that take them, and many of these emissions reductions arise from measures directed at individual and household
emissions.52 A second McKinsey report focusing on global rather than U.S. emissions reductions reaches similar conclusions. 3 Although neither report
calculates the total social costs and benefits of the government measures
necessary to achieve these reductions, the types of remedies discussed in the
reports and the net savings to the affected individuals both suggest that
the benefits will exceed the costs by a wide margin.
C.

Out-of-Pocket Government Cost

To represent low-hanging fruit, the emissions reductions not only
should be achievable at lower total national economic cost than competing
measures, but to reduce political resistance the total out-of-pocket cost to the
government entities that will stimulate the emissions reductions should also
be low. We again use as a rough benchmark for identifying current low-hanging
fruit $10 per ton, or half of the projected per-ton marginal cost of the
Lieberman-Warner Bill in the year 2015."4
We estimate that the recommended seven low-hanging fruit actions
can generate roughly 150 million tons in annual emissions reductions by
2014 with $2 billion in out-of-pocket cost to the government for public
information campaigns, subsidies, and other activities. As we note above,
this $2 billion is less than two percent of the 2008 economic stimulus

See CREYTS ET AL., supra note 30, at xii, xiii exhibit B (identifying as having "negative
52.
marginal costs" energy-efficient technologies related to lighting for residential electronics, residential buildings, fuel economy packages for cars and light trucks, new shell improvements for residential
buildings, and residential water heaters).
See BRESSAND ET AL., supra note 19, at 12, 51 (concluding both that the rates of return
53.
on energy-conserving measures of 10 percent or more could reduce emissions globally by half of the
amount necessary to achieve long-term stabilization of atmospheric CO2 levels and that "the most
substantial productivity improvement opportunity is in the residential sector").
See MURRAY & Ross, supra note 27, at 10-12, tbls.A-2 to A-4.
54.
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package. 5 The seven low-hanging fruit actions thus appear to be achievable
at an out-of-pocket government cost of roughly $13 per ton, or just over
our $10 per ton target.
D.

Personal Economic Cost

To increase efficacy and political viability, low-hanging fruit measures
also should achieve emissions reductions at no or even negative abatement
costs to individuals and households; that is, by carrying them out, people
should be able both to cut emissions and save money. Although many
examples exist of costly individual behavior change, studies of consumer and
nonconsumer environmentally significant behavior suggest that on balance
individuals will act in their pecuniary interest.56 Individual responses in times
of crisis suggest that if the perception that catastrophic climate change is
likely becomes widespread, then personal cost constraints may become less
important to behavior change efforts. Examples include the summer 2001
California energy crisis, 7 the public response to ozone depleting chemicals
in aerosol cans in the 1970s,"s and the success of scrap drives during World
War 11.' 9 For now, we assume that personal cost matters and that negative
marginal cost is a criterion for an action to constitute low-hanging fruit.
E.

Other Personal Barriers

The fact that individual and household emissions are very large and that
national and personal economic costs are low or negative does not translate
automatically into the potential for large-scale savings. Despite considerable success in the development of more efficient technologies, U.S.
citizens have been slow to embrace behavioral changes, either through
55.
See Herszenhom, supra note 29.
56.
See Stem, supra note 11, at 461-63.
57.
See Emily S. Bartholomew et al., Conservation in California During the Summer of 2001
(Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab., Paper No. LBNL-51477, 2002), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/
Ibnl/LBNL-51477; Loren Lutzenhiser et al., Conservation Behavior by Residential Consumers During and
After the 2000-2001 California Energy Crisis, in CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, PUBLIC INTEREST
STRATEGIES REPORT 146, 166 (2003), availableat http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/l00-03-012F.PDF.
58.
See, e.g., Peter M. Morrisette, The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone
Depletion, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 793, 795 fig. 1 (1989) (concluding that aerosol can sales dropped by
half even before the adoption of legal requirements regarding ozone depleting chemicals).
59.
See, e.g., RICHARD LINGEMAN, DON'T You KNOW THERE'S A WAR ON?: THE
AMERICAN HOME FRONT 1941-1945, at 15 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that an aluminum scrap drive
generated "great piles" of household metal goods at collection points); DAVID HINSHAW, THE
HOME FRONT 41 (1943) (stating that the government set a target of recovering one-fourth of all
kitchen grease).
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adoption of new technologies or direct changes in energy use that could
substantially reduce CO2 emissions. Research on recycling and other
environmentally significant behaviors suggests that behavior change is
difficult when sustained and substantial changes are necessary. 60 Social
scientists cite multiple barriers to behavior changes that reduce energy use,
including a high-consumption lifestyle, habits, inattention to energy practices, limited trust in energy providers and government, high discount rates
that discourage incurrence of high upfront costs for higher-efficiency technologies, and a principal-agent phenomenon whereby energy decisions are
made by others on behalf of the ultimate consumer." Although each
of these barriers can be overcome, to constitute a low-hanging fruit action
these types of personal barriers must be minimal.
II.

THE Low-HANGING FRUIT

A surprisingly large number of actions may meet the criteria identified
in Part I. Although in isolation any one action may appear trivial, when
multiplied across part or all of the roughly 110 million households in
America,62 each can produce enormous emissions savings. These actions are
the low-hanging fruit of individual and household emissions. They demand
relatively little of individuals but produce prompt, significant CO2 emissions
reductions when carried out in large numbers. They have the prospect not
only of reducing emissions but also of kick starting the process of engaging
the public in its role of reducing emissions, thus enhancing the prospects for
other measures as well.
To demonstrate the potential for prompt, large emissions reductions, in
this Part we identify seven low-hanging fruit actions and then demonstrate
how emissions reductions from these actions can be combined to achieve a
60.
See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1297-99 (2001)
(noting the difficulty of changing some large-number, small-payoff collective action problems).
61.
See, e.g., Henry Ruderman et al., The Behavior of the Market for Energy Efficiency in
Residential Appliances Including Heating and Cooling Equipment, 7 ENERGY J. 101, 115 (1987) (noting
high implicit discount rates); NRC, BEHAVIORAL ISSUES, supra note 11, at 18-20 (discussing the
influence of information on individual energy use); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING ENERGY
DEMAND ANALYSIS 27-42 (Paul C. Stem ed., 1984) (discussing the influence of price changes on
individual energy-consuming behaviors).
62.
According to the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau, there were 281,421,906 persons in the
United States and an average household size of 2.59 persons per household. U.S. Census Bureau,
American Factfinder Occupied Housing Characteristics, http://factfinder.census.gov/ (follow
"housing" hyperlink; then select "2000" tab; then follow "Occupied Housing Characteristics, for "all
states" hyperlink). Dividing the total population by persons per household generates a rough
estimate of 108.7 million households, but the actual number is 105,480,101. Id.
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quantifiable reduction target. In particular, we believe it is possible to reach
a target of reducing annual individual and household emissions by 7 percent
within five years (in other words, a "7-in-5" target).63 This amounts to reducing annual CO2 emissions by roughly 150 million tons below current levels by
2014, if we start in 2009. 4 As discussed in the Introduction, the 2014 savings
are the equivalent of removing 26 million automobiles from the road or
eliminating the need for 54 large power plants.65 In terms of the Pacala and
Socolow stabilization wedge concept, a single wedge represents annual CO2
emissions reductions of 370 million tons after five years, so the measures
discussed here would produce emissions reductions from the United States
alone equivalent to 40 percent of a global wedge after five years.66
A.

Identifying and Evaluating Interventions for Low-Hanging Fruit

1.

Identifying Potential Individual and Household Actions

Table 1 presents a number of examples of actions that may reduce
individual and household emissions.67 Each can be seen as an action that
falls in one of four categories: (1) reductions in the number of units
(technologies) that Americans use in daily life; (2) reductions in the use
of these units; (3) reductions in the amount of fuel consumed in the
operation of these units; and (4) reductions in the carbon content of
the energy required for the operation of these units. As can be seen
from Table 1, most possible actions involve either reduced use (conservation) or increased energy production per unit of CO2 generated (efficiency).

63.
The "7" refers to a 7 percent reduction from 2005 total annual CO2 emissions from the
individual and household sector. The "5" refers to the goal of achieving the total annual reduction
in calendar year 2014, five years from 2009.
64.
Total U.S. CO, emissions were 6.57 billion short tons in 2005. See World Carbon
Dioxide Emissions, supra note 38. If we assume that the individual and household sector accounted
for 32 percent of the total, see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text, then its emissions were 2.1
billion tons. A 7 percent reduction in the 2.1 billion ton total would generate reductions of 150
million tons.
65.
Calculations derived from EPA, UNIT CONVERSIONS, supra note 23.
66.
See Pacala & Sokolow, supra note 3, at 968. A wedge ramps up CO2 reductions linearly

from zero in the first year to 3.7 gigatons after fifty years, so at five years a wedge would comprise 370
million tons of CO,, and our 150 million ton reduction is40 percent of 370 million tons. See id.
67.
This list of practical actions was developed over the course of several meetings in June to
November 2007 by participants in the Climate Change Research Network.
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TABLE 1: POTENTIAL INDIVIDUAL AND HOUSEHOLD ACTIONS 68

A. Reduce Number of Units
(autos, appliances,
heating/cooling units, lights)

B. Reduce Use of Units

C.oued
A24.

1. Participate in car-sharing plans
in urban areas
2. Participate in auto and
appliance retirement programs
3. Take public transportation
4. Carpool
5. Move closer to work
6. Bike/walk
7. Telecommute
8. Take fewer airline flights
9. Turn off individual appliances
when not in use
10. Reduce "phantom" electricity use
or "leakage"
11. Use natural drying methods
when possible (clotheslines)
12. Install power save monitors
13. Turn lights off when not in use
14. Purchase motion sensing units
for on-off features
15. Install fans
16. Adjust household
thermostat settings
17. Close unneeded rooms
18. Use wood fireplace rather
than gas
19. Install programmable
thermostats
20. Purchase more fuel
efficient vehicle
21. Use overdrive/cruise control
22. Use slower acceleration
23. Reduce unnecessary braking
Travel slower on highway
25. Inflate tires
26. Reduce idling
27. Reduce air conditioning in
vehicle
28. Change airfilter in vehicle

68.

Measures in italics are discussed in detail in this Article.
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C. Reduce Amount of Fuel
Consumed (continued)

D. Reduce Carbon Content
of Fuel

29. Remove excess weight in
vehicle
30. Get tune-up/check oxygen
sensor
31. Purchase smaller/more fuel
efficient appliances
32. Adjust temperatures
(for water heater)
33. Wash clothes in warm water
and rinse in cold
34. Install low-flow showerheads
35. Place blanket on water heater
36. Substitute CFLs or LEDs for
incandescent lights
37. Change air filters in household
38. Replace heat pump filters
39. Tune up furnace and heat
pump on regular basis
40. Purchase high efficiency
furnaces and heat pumps
41. Add caulking, weatherstripping around windows,
doors, and other spaces
42. Add insulation
43. Take shorter airline trips
44. Fly during the day
45. Increase recycling volume
and rate
46. Use alternative fuels in
vehicles
* ethanol
" biodiesel
" electricity
* hydrogen
47. Install photovoltaic units
for electricity generation
48. Install solar thermal units
for water heating
49. Buy "green power" from
electricity suplier

We have identified seven of these actions that in the aggregate can
provide a reasonable chance of achieving the 7-in-5 target. Additional actions
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that also fit the low-hanging fruit characterization could enable the target to
be surpassed, but we focus on only seven here. At this stage, it is more
important to demonstrate the opportunities available from a limited number
of initiatives than to provide a laundry list of possibilities. The seven actions
are as follows:
* Reduce the component of motor vehicle idling that has
net costs to the driver;
* Reduce standby power electricity use;
" Accelerate the substitution of compact fluorescent light
bulbs (CFLs) for incandescent bulbs;
* Adjust temperature settings two degrees in both summer
and winter;
* Decrease household thermostat settings on water heaters;
* Maintain the recommended tire pressure in personal
motor vehicles; and
* Change air filters in personal motor vehicles
at recommended intervals.
An alternative approach to identifying a specific list of actions for
emissions reductions is simply to promote the 7-in-5 target and to let each
household determine its own path to meeting the target. This approach is
analogous to how most individuals approach personal dieting. In fact, the
concept of a low-carbon diet has been promoted as a means for individuals
to contribute to reducing climate change risks.69 The diet target in this case
would be 7 percent of a household's carbon "weight," and each residence would
be free to choose the actions that collectively would meet the target.
Although this approach is appealing, it also has major shortcomings.
Most individuals will not want to measure or to account for specific carbon
emissions associated with a menu of activities. Unfortunately, no comprehensive tools exist for quick and easy emissions reductions calculations.
Existing sources of information are diffuse, inconsistent, and unlikely
to provide sufficiently timely feedback to the individual." Consequently,
attentive individuals are likely to choose certain actions a la carte, hoping
or simply assuming they will meet the target. This indeterminacy is likely to

69.
See DAVID GERSHON, Low CARBON DIET: A 30-DAY PROGRAM TO LOSE 5,000
POUNDS 5 (2006); see also The Atkinson Diet-A Local Response to Global Warming,
http://www.theatkinsondiet.com (last visited June 15, 2008).
70.
See J. Paul Padgett et al., A Comparison of Carbon Calculators, 28 ENVTL. IMPACT
ASSESSMENT REV.

106 (2008).
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lead to recidivism-just as it does to most weight loss efforts." Fortunately,
the prescriptive list of measures advocated in this Article avoids such
fatal indeterminacy.
2.

Evaluating Emissions Reductions and Estimating Cost

Although below we quantify the contribution each of the seven actions
could make toward the 7-in-5 target, we note that quantification of the

emissions reductions achievable from these types of actions is an imprecise
art. In each case, doing so requires an estimate not only of current emissions, but also of the number of households likely to embrace the chosen
action. We do not assume full public adoption, and as a result our estimate
is not a rendering of a measure's full emissions reduction potential. Our
goal is not to provide precise, data-driven estimates of likely levels of behavior change, but rather to increase the awareness among policymakers and
academicians of the potential role of the individual and household sector
by demonstrating that on reasonable assumptions, prompt and large emissions reductions can be made at surprisingly low cost.
As stated in Part I, we began with a $10 per ton benchmark in evaluating the potential remedial measures. In other words, we examined
whether the target level of emissions reductions (7 percent of year 2005 total
individual and household CO 2 emissions, or roughly 150 million tons) could
be achieved at a total national economic cost of roughly $10 per ton (for
each ton of CO2 reduced in 2014). We were able to identify seven actions
that not only meet this target, but also achieve net social savings of several
billion dollars. In fact, the actions discussed below also can achieve
reductions that meet the more stringent criterion of total out-of-pocket

government cost in the $10 per ton range (all are less than $13 per ton).
Although a wide range of policy options are available to achieve these reductions, we examine two general approaches: a comprehensive general public
information campaign targeting all seven behaviors and a mix of a comprehensive general public information campaign, along with action-specific

71.
See, e.g., L. Bacon et al., Evaluatinga "Non-Diet" Wellness Intervention for Improvement of
Metabolic Fitness, Psychological Well-Being and Eating and Activity Behaviors, 26 INTL. J.OBESITY 854
(2002) (evaluating a weight-loss program).
72.
The 7-in-5 emissions reduction target and our cost calculations are intended to be rough
approximations. We do not account for emissions reductions that may occur before or after the 2014
target year in which we estimate that reductions of 150 million tons could occur. We also assume
that although much of the $1.5 billion will be spent in 2014, some earlier expenditures will occur.
We do not apply a discount rate to costs expended in future years.
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subsidies (for example, provision of free household energy meters to facilitate
adjustments in temperature settings) and other interventions.
a.

General Public Information Campaign

If the target emissions reduction level is 150 million tons and the target
cost is $10 per ton, expenditures can be in the neighborhood of $1.5 billion,
so long as the targeted actions themselves are not costly to the individual. In
fact, each of the low-hanging fruit discussed below meet the personal
economic cost criterion by generating net savings to the individual or
household. As a result, far more than $1.5 billion could be expended if the
target is net social costs (national economic costs) of $10 per ton. To be conservative, however, we use the $1.5 billion figure.
The simplest approach would be to expend $1.5 billion on a public
information campaign. Although it is not possible to know the extent to
which a campaign on this unprecedented scale would change individual
carbon-emitting behavior, empirical studies provide some basis for optimism.
Public information campaigns directed at environmentally significant behaviors have had mixed success in the past, but many of them were severely
underfunded. 3 Recent literature reviews have concluded that more than
half of the well-designed and funded programs have resulted in significant
and positive behavior change, with changes in the targeted behaviors of 7
to 30 percent. 4 It is quite possible that a well-managed public information
campaign that had a budget of $1.5 billion and that reflected the most
important advances in the social and behavioral sciences would generate
reductions in the low-hanging fruit sufficient to achieve the 150 million ton
target.7 5 In comparison, the national Truth campaign-an anti-smoking
effort-spent about $100 million per year for each of three years, and there
73.
See Vandenbergh, supra note 16, at 613 n.373.
74.
See, e.g., Monica Campbell et al., A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Environmental
Awareness Interventions, 91 CANADIAN J. PUB. HEALTH 137, 142 (2000) (reviewing Canadian
environmental public education campaigns and finding that more than half of the studies reported
changes in desired behaviors); Henk Staats et al., Effecting Durable Change: A Team Approach to
Improve Environmental Behavior in the Household, 36 ENV'T. & BEHAV. 341 (2004) (providing an
example of a well-crafted public education campaign that generated a 7 percent reduction in water
use and a roughly 30 percent reduction in solid waste generation).
Our estimates are optimistic in terms of what public information campaigns frequently
75.
deliver. We assume that there will be an effective public-private campaign for adoption (to be
discussed later) that will grab the public's attention. Participant numbers will only be known after
the program begins and as the result of careful public surveys. In addition, estimates of potential
emissions savings in the literature and in the popular press vary greatly, based on differing and
sometimes unstated assumptions. Rather than attempt to resolve these differences in the near term,
we have provided a range of estimates to capture the extent of possible outcomes.
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is some evidence that it was effective. 6 It is far from clear, however, that
a general national public information campaign would be the optimal
approach, and we evaluate a more targeted program below.
b.

Combined General and Action-Specific Interventions

The second approach we examine is a combination of a general public information campaign with targeted subsidies or other interventions for
each of the seven low-hanging fruit actions. For our subsequent analysis, we
assume an expenditure of roughly $800 million on a general public
information campaign concerning all seven low-hanging fruit actions, and
$100 million each on interventions targeted at the seven behaviors, for a
total of $1.5 billion. We do not claim that an allocation of $100 million to each
low-hanging fruit action is the optimal distribution of funds, but we use
these figures to demonstrate the plausibility of the reductions that could be
achieved from total government expenditures at around the $10 per ton
level. The one exception to this allocation is in our choice to reallocate half
a share ($50 million) from automobile idling reduction to accelerating
adoption of CFLs. We fear sharply diminishing marginal returns in attempts
to change idling behavior by more than roughly 10 percent,77 but replacing
hundreds of millions of incandescent light (IL) bulbs with compact fluorescents is feasible and could yield significant reductions in CO2 emissions. 8
B. Seven Low-Hanging Fruit Actions
This analysis examines the extent to which the seven low-hanging fruit
actions meet the five criteria identified in Part I.
1.

Reduce Personal Motor Vehicle Engine Idling

Approximately 5 to 8 percent of gasoline consumed by personal passenger vehicles is consumed while idling. 9 A typical personal vehicle releases 570
76.
See, e.g., Matthew C. Farrelly et. al, Evidence of a Dose-Response Relationship Between "Truth"
Antismoking Ads and Youth Smoking Preuwence, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 425, 425,428-30 (Mar. 2005); Lisa
K. Goldman & Stanton A. Glantz, Evaluation of Antismoking Advertising Campaigns, 279 J. AM. MED.
Ass'N 772 (1998).
77.
See discussion, infra Part II.B.I.
78.
See discussion, infra Part II.B.3.
79.
See Yoshitaka Motoda & Masaaki Taniguchi, A Study on Saving Fuel by Idling Stops While
Driving Vehicles, 4 PROc. E. ASIA SOC'Y FOR TRANSP. STUD. 1335, 1344 (2003); K. Ueda et al.,
Idling Stop System Coupled With Quick Start Features of Gasoline Direct Injection 1 (SAE Technical
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to 920 pounds of CO2 per year and the total emissions due to personal
vehicles in the United States are 55 to 90 million short tons per year." If
a vehicle will idle for more than 5 to 10 seconds, shutting the engine off
and restarting it when the driver is ready to resume driving typically will not
only reduce fuel consumption, but also will reduce wear-and-tear on the
engine, improve fuel economy, and improve the performance of catalytic
converters.' For idle times of 45 seconds or more, the savings in fuel
consumption and engine maintenance from shutting off the engine vastly
exceed the minor wear-and-tear associated with restarting the engine."
Ultimately, a combination of new technology and behavior changes may
make it possible to reduce idling by at least 50 percent, 3 but for this Article,
we choose a much more conservative target of a 10 percent reduction
because we are focusing on behavior changes that can be easily achieved at
low cost. This would reduce CO2 emissions by 6 to 9 million tons per year
Paper 2001-01-0545, 2001); Gordon W.R. Taylor, Review of the Incidence, Energy Use and Costs of
Passenger Vehicle Idling 4-1 (Aug. 2002) (unpublished report, on file with the UCLA Law Review).
80.
The average household vehicle consumes 592 gallons of fuel per year for personal use.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, PUBL'N No. 0464, HOUSEHOLD VEHICLES ENERGY
USE: LATEST DATA AND TRENDS 60 tbl. A3 (2005) [hereinafter EIA, HOUSEHOLD VEHICLES].

Each gallon of fuel consumed produces 19.4 pounds of CO2. ENVT'L. PROT. AGENCY, EPA420-F-05001, EMISSION FACTS: AVERAGE CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS RESULTING FROM GASOLINE AND

DIESEL FUEL 2 (2005), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/420fO5001.pdf. Thus, the average personal
vehicle produces 11,485 pounds, or 5.7 short tons, of CO2 per year. Five to eight percent of this is 574
to 918 pounds, which may be rounded to 570 to 920 pounds. Total fuel consumption for personal
use in the United States is 113 billion gallons per year. EIA, HOUSEHOLD VEHICLES, supra, at 53.
This produces 2.19 trillion pounds, or 1.10 billion short tons of CO. Five to eight percent of this
total is 55 to 88 million tons, which may be rounded to 55 to 90 million tons.
81.
See Taylor, supra note 79, at 4-1, 4-2; Ueda et al., supra note 79, at 9-10 figs.14-15; M.
Matsuura et al., Fuel Consumption Improvement of Vehicles by Idling Stop 3 (SAE Technical Paper
2004-01-1896, 2004); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 420-F-93-002, YOUR CAR AND CLEAN AIR: WHAT

YOU CAN Do TO REDUCE POLLUTION 3 (1994), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/consumer/18-youdo.pdf.
82.

See Taylor, supra note 79, at 4-2.

83.
No reliable data exist on what fraction of idling in the United States satisfies either the
10-second or the 45-second criteria. More thorough studies conducted in Japan find that at least 50
percent of idling meets these criteria. Hideaki Takahara et al., Continuously Variable Transmission
Control System for Toyota Intelligent Idling Stop System 8-9 (SAE Technical Paper #2004-01-1635,
2004) (noting that idling corresponds to 17.9 percent of fuel consumption in Japan and that an idlestop can reduce fuel consumption by 9 percent, which is 51 percent of total consumption while
idling). A much larger fraction of U.S. driving is on highways or rural roads than Japan, so the
overall fraction of fuel consumed while idling should be smaller in the United States. But since most
idling will occur in city driving, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that a similar fraction of
U.S. idling is likely to be longer than 10 seconds and thus reasonable for drivers to reduce. For this
Article, however, we make the much more conservative assumption that our policy measures will
reduce idling by 10 percent, so the viability of this policy prescription relies only on the assumption
that at least 10 percent of U.S. idling, as opposed to measured values of 51 percent of Japanese idling,
satisfies the 10-second criterion. The lack of detailed data on U.S. idling makes it clear that more
detailed research on idling in the United States would be valuable.
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while reducing criteria pollutants and saving the average driver somewhere
in the range of $9 to $14 per year."
One significant obstacle to changing behavior regarding idling vehicles
is the common set of false beliefs that cars need to warm up for a significant
time before being driven. Another is that shutting off the engine briefly
and then restarting it consumes more fuel and produces more pollution than
allowing the engine to idle.8" Although this may once have been the
case, modern fuel-injected engines need almost no warm-up-time, and
restarting a warm engine consumes less fuel and emits less pollution than
idling for 5 to 10 seconds. s6 Countering this misinformation with a public
education campaign may affect idling behavior by aligning drivers' economic
self-interest with emissions reduction. Anti-idling laws also may have
value in signaling normative expectations that drivers not idle their engines
for extended periods while waiting to drop off and pick up passengers, or in
drive-through lines at banks, fast-food restaurants, and similar facilities."
A number of experiments performed in Canada under the auspices of
Natural Resources Canada have found that idling can be reduced by public
information campaigns. For example, the city of Mississauga performed a
public education campaign to reduce idling.8 Although it was not possible
to monitor idling for the entire city, one part of this campaign carefully
measured idling behavior in 500 cars belonging to parents as they picked up
and dropped off children at school.89 This campaign reduced the number
of cars idling from 54 to 29 percent of the sample and reduced the mean
duration of idling from 8 to 3.5 minutes, a 76 percent reduction in total
idling.9 The campaign cost Can $80,000 (US $51,000 in 2002) for one year

84.
Reducing 55 to 90 million tons of CO, emission due to idling by 10 percent would save
5.5 to 9 million tons, which we round to 6 to 9 million tons. Saving 0.5 to 0.8 percent of 592 gallons
of fuel at $3 per gallon generates a total of $8.80 to $14.20, which we round to between $9 to $14.
See EIA, HOUSEHOLD VEHICLES, supranote 80, at 60 tbl.A3 (providing emissions due to idling and
average household vehicle fuel consumption).
85.
For a discussion of idling beliefs, see Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 1, at 1701.
86.
See Taylor, supra note 79, at 4-1; Ueda et al., supra note 79, at 9 fig.14; Matsuura, supra
note 81, at 4.
87.
See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 400 (1997) (noting that the enactment of legal requirements can convey
information about the regulated conduct in addition to creating a risk of a formal legal sanction for
noncompliance).
88.

LURA CONSULTING, TOWARDS AN IDLE-FREE ZONE IN THE CITY OF MISSISSAUGA: FINAL

REPORT 1-5 (2003).
89.
Id. at 13.
90.
Id.
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for a city of 625,000, or US $0.08, per resident.9 If these numbers are
representative of broader changes in idling behavior, the emissions reductions
would total around 80,000 tons of CO2 per year for the city, and the cost
of achieving those reductions via a public education campaign to change
behavior would be US $0.64 per ton of CO 2.9 2 School drop-off and
pick-up activities are not typical, however, and therefore the foregoing
numbers probably significantly overestimate the impact of the campaign."
Nonetheless, even if the actual idling reductions are 20 times lower, the
cost would still total only slightly more than US $10 per ton.
Additionally, the city of Edmonton, Alberta, has had great success changing the on-the-job driving behavior of city employees to improve their fuel
economy. An education and training program called Fuel Sense has been in
place since 2000 at an annual cost of Can $45,000 (US $29,000 in 2002). 94
By reducing idling and encouraging more efficient driving, the program has
reduced annual fuel consumption of city vehicles by 10 percent, saving
over Can $175,000 (US $110,000) annually and reducing CO, emissions by
340 tons per year.95 Each year more drivers are educated and both greenhouse
gas emissions and fuel costs are reduced. Although US $29,000 may appear
to be a large amount to spend to reduce emissions by only 340 tons ($85 per
ton if the fuel savings are excluded), the fact that the fuel savings recoup the
education costs more than threefold in a single year suggests that spending
public funds for educational programs such as this would be justified by
taxpayers' fuel savings and by the goal of better insulating against oil supply
91.
Id.at 25. For exchange rates, see Financial Mkts. Dep't Bank of Canada, Annual Average
of Exchange Rates (2002), http://www.bank-banque-canada.ca/pdf/nraa02.pdf (indicating that the
average exchange rate in 2002 was Can $1.570 to US $1.00).
92.
A typical personal vehicle emits 574 to 918 pounds of CO2 per year while unnecessarily
idling. See supra note 80. To simplify the following discussion we take the average of this range, 746
pounds. Reducing this by 76 percent would cut annual CO2 emissions by 567 pounds, or 0.28 tons
per vehicle. Canada has 0.44 automobiles per capita. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., FHWA-PL-01-0102,
OUR NATION'S HIGHWAYS 2000, at 8 (2000). See also underlying data, accessed at Office of Highway
Policy Info., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Annual Automobile Vehicle Miles of Travel (VMT) per Capita
and Number of Automobiles per Capita 1997, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/onh00/bar4.htm
(last visited July 14, 2008). Consequently, we estimate C2 reductions of around 80,000 tons total
in a city of 625,000 residents. US $51,000 divided by 80,000 tons CO, equals US $0.64 per ton CO, .
93.
The school intervention targeted extended idling, but a number of studies suggest that
more than half of automobile idling occurs at traffic signals or in stop-and-go traffic, and lasts less
than one minute. Changing behavior at a stop light is probably much more difficult than changing
behavior in a driveway and could raise other safety and efficiency issues. See Taylor, supra note 79, at
2-1 to 2-6.
94.
TRANSP. CANADA, CASE STUDY No. 24, TP14269E, FUEL SENSE: MAKING FLEET AND
TRANSIT OPERATIONS MORE EFFICIENT 1,3 (2004). For the exchange rate, see Bank of Canada,
supra note 91.
95.
TRANSP. CANADA, supra note 94, at 3.
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shocks. Additionally, the drivers' newly acquired habits persist after they are
trained, and each year the program trains new drivers, so the fuel savings and
emissions reductions continue to grow.96 Over time, the program expects to
more than double the fuel savings and emissions reductions without increasing its operating budget.97

Other research by Natural Resources Canada suggests that as successful as simple education campaigns can be, these campaigns may function better in conjunction with laws that exact penalties for excessive
idling. 98 In ten cities and communities around Canada, public education
programs that addressed myths about idling and explained the need to reduce
idling were combined with legal idling bans to reinforce the sense that idling
is a serious problem. Evaluations found that the combination of education
and legal measures succeeded in reinforcing driver awareness, but quantitative studies of idling reduction were not performed. 99
Another obstacle to changing idling behavior is the value of the driver's
attention. Although this is not a monetary cost, it clearly costs the driver
to pay attention to turning off the engine when the vehicle is stationary. Hybrid cars automatically shut off their engines when idling,
and as much as 30 percent of the difference in fuel economy between
hybrid and conventional cars is due to this automatic idle-stop feature."°
Similar devices, called integrated starter-generators (ISGs) or micro-hybrid
powertrains, exist for conventional gasoline engines. Some manufacturers
are now offering them as optional equipment in Europe, and they will soon
be offered in the United States.'"' The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) estimates that with economies of scale ISGs would cost
around $300 to $650 packaged with related energy-saving technology and

96.
Id. at 3 (noting that retesting drivers a year after training found excellent retention of
efficient driving skills).
97.
Id. (concluding that "[als more drivers are trained in Fuel Sense principles, it is estimated that
annual fuel cost savings could well be over halfa million dollars").

98.

See NATURAL RES. CAN., THE CARROT, THE STICK, AND THE COMBO: A RECIPE FOR

6-7 (2005).
99.
Id. at 21-22.
100.
See, e.g., HIDEAKI TAKAHARA ET AL, Continuously Variable Transmission Control System
for Toyota Intelligent Idling System, SAE TECHNICAL PAPER #2004-01-1635, at 6-7 (Fig. 11-12)
(2004) (analyzing the Toyota hybrid engine).
101.
See Don Sherman, Features Out of Sight, But Top of Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007,
Technology Section, at 2 (noting that Mazda in the 2009 model year will offer an ISG automatic
idle-stop option in the United States); What's New: Technology, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Dec. 3, 2007,
at 16F; Vito J. Racanelli, Luxury Autos 2007: Green Machine, BARRON'S, Sept. 24, 2007, at 33.
REDUCING VEHICLE IDLING IN CANADIAN COMMUNITIES
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would reduce fuel consumption by 5 to 9 percent, allowing fuel savings to
repay the added purchase price in around two to seven years.102
Consumers apply very different mental accounting to large infrequent
expenses, such as appliance or automobile purchases, than to smaller recurring expenses, such as gasoline or electricity. This difference leads consumers to reject paying extra for energy efficient cars or appliances, even
when the reduced fuel or electricity bills would repay the added purchase
price at a favorable rate of return." This effect creates an inefficient market
for anti-idling and other fuel efficiency measures for automobiles, even
disregarding pollution externalities." 4 Since measures to reduce pollution
externalities also would work in the consumer's favor, it may be desirable
to correct for the anomalous consumer behavior with either rebates or
technology mandates. Since many automobile manufacturers are already
adding automatic anti-idle options to their production lines, mandating such
equipment would not impose a great hardship. In addition, if we consider
the owner's savings in fuel and maintenance, the total net cost of mandating
this technology would be negative. However, mandating technology, such as
ISGs, requires a long lead time because factories lock in designs many years
in advance. In any case, until anti-idle technology thoroughly penetrates the
motor vehicle market, measures to address idling behavior will remain
important. Thus, a short-term program focusing on five-year deliverables will
need to balance public education, consumer incentives for purchasing idle-stop
options currently offered by auto manufacturers, and possibly laws focusing
on individual behavior, such as the Canadian anti-idling laws.
An idling-reduction program similar to Mississauga's, if applied to the
entire United States, would cost around $25 million. 1 5 If such a campaign,
together with an additional $25 million in aid to states for adopting and

102. See JEFF ALSON ET AL., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA420-R-05-012, INTERIM REPORT:
NEW POWERTRAIN TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR PROJECTED COSTS 17 tbl.2-1 (2005). The average
vehicle uses 592 gallons of gasoline per year, at a cost of $1,776 for $3.00 per gallon gasoline. EIA,
HOUSEHOLD VEHICLES, supra note 80, at 56. Reducing this by 5 to 9 percent would save $89 to $160 per
year. Dividing the $300 to $650 cost of an ISG by this savings yields a two to seven year payback time.
103.
See George Loewenstein and Drake Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and
an Interpretation,in CHOICE OVER TIME 119, 137-38 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992).
104.
We use the term automobiles to include light trucks, such as SUVs, that are used for
personal driving.
105.
This is $0.08 per person for 300 million people in the United States. See supra note 62.
The U.S. automobile ownership rate is 0.48 per capita, which is only slightly higher than Canada's
0.44 per capita, so we expect the cost per driver to be similar or even slightly less in the United States
than in Canada. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., supra note 92, at 8.
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enforcing anti-idling laws, 106 reduces idling by even 10 percent, annual CO,
emissions would drop by 6 to 9 million tons' 7 at a cost of $6 to $9 per ton.
Additional environmental benefits would accrue from reduced emissions of
air pollutants that produce smog and cause respiratory illness. Beyond the
environmental benefits, a 10 percent reduction in idling would save car
owners $1.7 to $2.7 billion per year in fuel costs."'
Alternatively, a $50 million federal program to rebate $150 per ISG
would fund ISGs for 270,000 cars, allowing 20 percent for administrative
overhead. In the first full year of the new vehicles' use, this would save
78,000 to 138,000 tons of CO 2 at a cost of $360 to $640 per ton.'" When
emissions reductions are considered over the vehicles' sixteen-year average
lifetime,"0 this would eliminate 1.2 to 2.2 million tons of CO 2 emissions,
reducing the cost per ton to $23 to $42. Although this figure might seem
to be a steep price to pay for CO 2 reduction, if one also considers the $24 to
$43 million per year that would be saved in gasoline by the drivers of cars in
this program,"' the net social benefit would exceed the costs so long as the
subsidy program did not merely attract free riders.' 2 Such a subsidy may
not be the most effective way to stimulate adoption of ISGs, however, and
further research is warranted before proposing such a policy. In the

106.
$25 million would finance 860 programs similar to Edmonton's. These could be targeted
toward large cities, where idling is more prevalent due to greater traffic congestion and where a higher
density of automobiles could improve the number of drivers reached by a public education program.
107.
Idling is responsible for 55 to 90 million tons of CO2 per year. See supra note 80.
108.
Every year 5.7 to 9.0 billion gallons of gasoline are consumed while idling during personal
use. Supra note 80. Reducing this by 10 percent would reduce consumption by 570 to 900 million
gallons of gasoline per year. At $3.00 per gallon, this would save $1.7 to $2.7 billion per year.
109.
The average personal vehicle produces 5.7 tons of CO per year. Supra note 92. Five to nine
percent of this would be 0.29 to 0.51 tons per year per vehicle. Multiplying this figure by 270,000
vehicles yields a total annual emissions reduction of 78,000 to 138,000 tons of CO,. Dividing $50
million by this emissions reduction yields $360 to $640 per ton.
110.
AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL STATEMENT OF REASONS,
REGULATIONS TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM MOTOR VEHICLES 12 (2005),

available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/grnhsgas/fsor.pdf (noting that the average vehicle lifetime
is 16 years); AIR RES. BD., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING
DOCUMENT: ESTIMATION OF AVERAGE LIFETIME VEHICLE MILES OF TRAVEL 1 (2004), available at

http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/gmhsgas/vmt.pdf (noting that the average lifetime is 16 year for cars
and 18 years for light-duty trucks).
111.
Multiplying the $89 to $160 annual fuel savings for an average personal vehicle, supra
note 102, by 270,000 vehicles yields $24 to $43 million per year in fuel savings.
112.
See, e.g., Rob Aalbers et al., Subsidising the Adoption of Energy-Efficient Technologies: An
Empirical Analysis of the Free-Rider Effect, in KORNELIS BLOCK ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICY
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENT IN FIRMS 31, 31-49 (2004); CHRIS ANN
SEBOLD ET AL., PAC. GAS & ELEC. STUDY No. PG&E-SW040, A FRAMEWORK FOR PLANNING
AND ASSESSING PUBLICLY FUNDED ENERGY EFFICIENCY 5-23, 6-18 to 6-19 (2001).
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short run, policies to promote behavioral idling reduction appear to
have more impact per dollar spent.'
Although anti-idling education campaigns can be very cost-effective,
they are likely to suffer from diminishing marginal returns. Therefore, rather
than investing the nominal $100 million in anti-idling measures, we
propose a $50 million program of education, law adoption, and enforcement. Many state and local governments have anti-idling laws in place, but
they are rarely enforced and typically prohibit only idling times that greatly
exceed the recommended times for saving fuel and reducing CO2 emissions."'
Small changes in enforcement and idling time limits may be possible with
little public resistance. If we assume the out-of-pocket government cost
to be $50 million for a program to reduce idling by 10 percent and add
one-fourteenth of the cost of the $800 million general public information
campaign ($57 million), then the total government cost is $107 million.
If the emissions reductions are 6 to 9 million tons per year, the costs to
the government per ton of CO2 reduced are $12 to $19. The aggregate
savings to households from reduced gasoline consumption would be $1.7 to
$2.7 billion per year, however. As a result, the $107 million cost would
be significantly less than the $1.7 to $2.7 billion annual savings on gasoline,
and the program would reduce CO 2 emissions by millions of tons at a significantly negative net national economic cost.
2.

Reduce Standby Power Use

Most people probably do not know that their appliances continue to
draw power when they are not in use. Many products do so in order to turn
on quickly when the consumer presses the power button. This means that
households are paying for electricity usage 24 hours-a-day, 365 days-a-year,
whether they are using appliances or not. And this standby power, sometimes
called phantom power, vampire power, or leakage, can occur if many appliances throughout the household are simultaneously drawing power. Large
electronics, especially televisions, are notable for consuming particularly
large amounts of standby power. The growth of home-computer networks,
113.
More effective ways to encourage adoption of ISGs than direct consumer rebates also may
exist. We are not aware of the best practices studies of programs to encourage the purchase of
energy-efficient vehicles, but there is extensive literature on best practices to encourage purchase
of energy-efficient appliances for the home, and many of these lessons may be transferable. See, e.g.,
sources cited infra note 168.
114.
See generally ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA PUBL'N NO. A420-B-06-004, COMPILATION
OF STATE, COUNTY, AND LOCAL ANTI-IDLING REGULATIONS (2006) (identifying state and local
anti-idling laws).
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especially wireless networks, is also responsible for a significant fraction of
the growth of household electricity consumption."
Despite a worldwide effort to reduce levels of standby power requirements in appliances, including Energy Star and related low-power certification programs for some products,"' the gains from these programs
have been undermined by other consumer electronics trends. Most notably,
these trends include the growth in large-screen televisions, which consume
far more power than traditional televisions and come with user options

configured by default to use maximum power."7 Some large-screen televisions can use as much power in standby mode as a refrigerator."' According
to the U.S. Department of Energy, 40 percent of electricity consumption by
home electronics occurs in standby mode." 9 Certain appliances, such as
microwave ovens and video recorders (VCRs), actually consume more
electricity over the course of a year running their clock displays in standby
mode than they do while in use.'20

115.

See Alan Meier & Bruce Nordman, Energy Efficient Networks: Practical Problems,

Presentation at the Standby Power Consumption Workshop 8 (Sept. 25-26, 2007) (slide presentation
available at http://www.conae.gob.mx/work/sites/CONAE/resources/LocalContent/5343/1I/
AlanMeier2.pdf) (concluding that home and office computers and networking equipment represent
7 percent of all U.S. electricity consumption and that the potential direct savings from reducing
standby consumption by networks isone billion dollars per year).
116.
Energy Star is a program jointly administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Energy. It establishes energy-efficiency standards and
certifies products that comply. The goal of this program is to help consumers reduce their energy
consumption, thereby saving money and reducing pollution. According to EPA figures, use of
Energy Star certified products saved U.S. consumers in 2007 more than $16 billion in utility bills
and reduced CO, emissions by more than 48 million short tons. ENVT'L PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY
STAR OVERVIEW OF 2007 ACHIEVEMENTS 1 (2008), available at http://www.energystar.gov/ia/
partners/publications/pubdocs/2007%20CPPD%204pg.pdf; ENVT'L PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY STAR:
THE POWER TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH ENERGY EFFICIENCY (2003), available
at http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/downloads/energy-star-report-aug-2003.pdf (describing
the history and purpose of Energy Star).
117.
"[T]he Market Transformation Programme warns that televisions are often set for display in shops, rather than the much lower levels of light needed for home use. It suggests that
creating an 'eco-mode' for screen brightness could cut power consumption by 15%." See
Sean Coughlan, Do Flat-Screen TVs Eat More Energy?, BBC News, Dec. 7 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/magazine/6188940.stm.
118.
Larry Magid, Putting Energy Hogs in the Home on a Strict Low-Power Diet, N.Y. TIMES, June
4, 2007, at C12.
119.
Id.
120.

KAREN B. ROSEN & ALAN K. MEIER, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB. REPORT LBNL-

42393, ENERGY USE OF TELEVISIONS AND VIDEOCASSETTE RECORDERS IN THE U.S. 34 (1999);
BENOI LEBOT, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL LAB. REPORT LBNL-46019, GLOBAL
IMPLICATIONS OF STANDBY POWER USE 1, reprinted in PROC. 2000 ACEEE SUMMER STUDY ON

ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN BUILDINGS, ASILOMAR (2000).
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Standby power constitutes around 5 to 7 percent of the average U.S.
household's total electricity use and 10 percent for the average household in
California, where there is a greater than average penetration of consumer
electronics and home office equipment.' The electricity used by the average home in the United States produces 7.2 tons of CO, per year, while total
domestic electricity consumption produces 935 million tons. Thus, standby
consumption is responsible for 47 to 65 million tons of CO 2 per year.1 If
standby consumption can be reduced by one-third, this would reduce CO,
emissions by 16 to 22 million tons.
Addressing standby power use effectively will require a combination of
technology mandates, consumer education (for example, standardized energy
consumption labeling), and behavior change. Standby power costs the average household $48 to $67 per year, 121 suggesting that so long as remedial
measures fall below this level, they will generate cost savings for the
individual. Policy interventions thus should target barriers that inhibit
people from adopting cost-effective measures to reduce their standby
power consumption.
The simplest way to address standby electricity consumption is to turn
off devices when they are not in use. Many devices such as microwave
ovens and televisions, however, do not have true "off' settings, but rather
continue to draw power for clock displays, warming up internal components
for instant on performance, or to respond to remote controls. In these cases,
the owner may still achieve a true off condition by unplugging the device or
121.

ALAN K. MEIER, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB. PAPER LBNL-49377, A WORLDWIDE

REVIEW OF STANDBY POWER USE IN HOMES 3 fig.l, tbl.2 (2001); J.P. Ross & A. Meier, Measurements
of Whole-House Standby Power Consumption in CaliforniaHouses, 27 ENERGY 861, 861 (2002).
122.
The Energy Information Administration estimates that the average household uses 10,656
kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity per year. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
RESIDENTIAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION SURVEYS: 2001 CONSUMPTION AND EXPENDITURES TABLES

3, tbl.CEl-Ic (2002), available at ftp://ftp.eia.doe.gov/pub/consumption/residential/200lcetables/
enduseconsump2001.pdf. Although the carbon intensity of electricity varies, the national average
is 1.35 pounds of CO, per kWh consumed. See U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY & U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS FROM THE GENERATION OF ELECTRIC POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES 2 (2000) [hereinafter DOE, EPA, CO2 FROM ELECTRIC POWER], available at

http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/co2_report/co2eniss.pdf. Thus, the average household's electricity use produces 7.2 tons of CO, annually. Total residential electricity use produces 935 million
tons of CO. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
AND SINKS: 1990-2005, at 3-7, tbl.3-6 (2008) [hereinafter GHG EMISSIONS AND SINKS],
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloadsO6/07CR.pdf. Standby use produces 5 to 7 percent
of this 935 million tons, or 47 to 65 million tons. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
123.
The cost of electricity is roughly $0.09 per kilowatt hour. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP't OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0348, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2006, at 9 (2007). Thus, the
average U.S. household pays around $960 per year for electricity, and 5 to 7 percent of $960 is $48
to $67. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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using a switchable power strip. Yet this entails a degree of inconvenience
that may well deter energy-saving behavior changes.
A combination of recent advances in technology and regulatory requirements or market pressure could overcome these barriers. Many devices draw
substantial power-tens of watts-in standby mode, but it is almost always
possible to design them to draw one watt or less. Mandating a one-wattmaximum for standby power consumption could cut standby power by 68
percent, or 32 to 44 million tons of CO annually.2 2 The EPA's voluntary
Energy Star standards now specify a 1-watt-standby-draw, 2 1 and some manufacturers are aiming for 0.1 watts over the next several years."'
Another technological fix consumers can adopt if their appliances do
not meet the low-standby-power criterion is automatic energy-saving
power strips. Relatively inexpensive ($30-$60) power strips are now
available that automatically switch power to their outlets on and off when 2a7
low-power motion sensor detects someone entering or leaving the room.1
Power distribution units offer the convenience of turning appliances on and off
by remote control.2 8 Other smart power strips monitor the electric current
drawn by a master device, such as a computer or a stereo amplifier, and
automatically switch all the attached peripheral devices on and off appropriately.' 29 Just a few of these power strips, strategically placed in the
household, can greatly reduce leakage and reduce electricity bills as well.
If a household used three such power strips (reducing its standby power
use by two-thirds), the electricity savings would repay the initial cost within

124.
125.

See Ross & Meier, supra note 121, at 867 (based on a study of ten California homes).
See, e.g., ENERGY STAR@ PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR TVS, VCRS, DCR TVS

WITH POD SLOTS, COMBINATION UNITS, TELEVISION MONITORS, AND COMPONENT TELEVISION
UNITS ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA (Version 2.2), http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/product.specs/

eligibility/tv vcr_elig.pdf (specifying standby power of <1.0 Watt for TVs, VCRs, DVDs, and
combination units as of July 1, 2005); ENERGYSTAR PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSUMER
AUDIO AND DVD PRODUCTS, http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/product-specs/eligibility/
audio__dvd elig.pdf at 4 (specifying standby power of< 1.0 Watt for products shipping after Dec. 31, 2002).
126.
David Maciel, Sony and the Environment, presentation at the Energy Efficiency
Stand-by Power Consumption Workshop, Mexico City, Sept. 25-26 2007, at 8, available at
http://www.conae.gob.mx/work/sites/CONAE/resourceWLocalContent/5343/1/DavidMaciel.pdf (concluding that Sony has a target of 0.1 watts of standby power consumption with a two-year lead time).
127.
Manufacturers include Bits Ltd. and Wattstopper. See Tom Mainelli, Brainy Power Strip,
PC WORLD, APR. 2003, at 66 (reviewing smart power strips); see also Umbra Fisk, Strip Tease: On
Power Strips, GRIST, Nov. 5, 2007, http://www.grist.org/advice/ask/2007/11/05/index.html.
128.
Remotely controlled power distribution units are sold by* many manufacturers, such as
Tripp-Lite. See, e.g., TRIPP-LITE, INC., POWER DISTRIBUTION UNIT SELECTION GUIDE, TECHNICAL

APPLICATION BULLETIN #95-2893 (2008), available at http://www.tripplite.com/shared/pdf/
literature/200710208.pdf.
129.
Mainelli, supra note 127.
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five years."' Consumers' extremely high discount rates for long-term savings from one-time purchases tend to serve as a barrier, however, to
economically favorable investments in energy-saving devices.' Thus, public
interventions in the form of education, incentives, or technology mandates
may be desirable.'32
Because standby power use is largely invisible, making information about
cost of ownership available to consumers at the time of purchase may have
a significant effect on behavior. A study by Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory found that the EPA's voluntary Energy Star labeling program has
produced changes in purchasing that reduce electricity bills by billions of
dollars a year. The changes also reduce CO2 emissions by tens of millions
of tons per year."'
Despite the prospect of reducing standby power through purchases of
more efficient equipment, daily behavior changes may be the most efficient
approach in some cases. Small external power supplies used to charge handheld electronics, such as cell phones, music players, and batteries for power
tools, draw power while plugged in, even when the device is not charging.
New technology chargers that sense whether they are being used and switch
into a low-power sleep mode are now available at low enough cost to be
competitive when reduced electric bills are considered.' Greater reductions

130.
Standby use costs $48 to $67 per year, see discussion supra notes 122-123 and accompanying
text. Much of the standby power is concentrated in media centers and personal computer centers or
home offices see supra notes 115, 118, 119, 120. Thus, it is reasonable to estimate that three smart
power strips controlling a combination of media centers and personal computer centers would
significantly reduce total standby power consumption by as much as two-thirds. Saving two-thirds of
this total yields a range of $32 to $45 per year. Three smart outlet strips at $30 to $60 would cost $90
to $180-an amount that would be recouped in 3 to 5.5 years.
131.
See NRC, HUMAN DIMENSION, supra note 13, at 36-42.
132.
For inconsistent accounting, see Loewenstein and Prelec, supranote 103, at 137-38. Consumers are often reluctant to pay up front for energy-saving appliances or devices even when reduced energy
bills will repay the initial investment at very favorable terms. Id. Interventions targeted at this reluctance
should be an important part of this program. Well-designed interventions have proved effective at encouraging adoption of compact fluorescent lights, see discussion infra Part II.B.3, so we are optimistic in this regard.
133.
C.A. Webber et al., Savings Estimates for theENERGY STAR Voluntary Labeling Program,
28 ENERGY POL'Y 1137, 1144 tbl.4, 1148 fig.1 (2000). This article concludes that in 2000, total
energy savings were $2.5 billion and carbon emissions were reduced by 6.7 million tons, which
translates to 25 million tons of CO2 . Id. at 1142 tbl.3. By 2010, the article forecasts CO2 emissions
reductions of 20 million tons per year of carbon, equivalent to 73 million tons of CO2. Id. at 1146, tbl.6.
These figures assume market penetration limited to a "target" population that is receptive to Energy
Star labeling. Id. If one hundred percent penetration were achieved, the emission reductions would
be more than twice as large. Id. at 1148 fig.1.
134.
See, e.g., Rich Fassler, Recent Advances in Reducing Standby Power, Presentation at the
Energy Efficiency Stand-by Power Consumption Workshop, Mexico City, Sept. 25-26 2007, at 8,
availableat http://www.conae.gob.mx/work/sites/CONAE/resourcesfLocalContent/5343/l/RFassler.pdf
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in consumption can still be achieved, however, by unplugging the charger
altogether when it is not in use. Nokia has introduced a cell phone that
alerts its user to unplug the charger when the phone is fully charged."'
Further research is needed to determine whether it is more efficient to
educate consumers to unplug unused chargers or to focus on hastening the
adoption of more efficient and smarter chargers.
Whatever the optimum blend of public interventions, if it is possible
to cut standby consumption by two-thirds in half of the households in
the United States (one-third of total U.S. standby consumption), we calculate resulting emissions reductions of 16 to 22 million tons of CO,. 136 If a $100
million program of public education and subsidies for purchasing energysaving devices achieved these savings, the cost would be $4.55 to $6.25
per ton.
In addition, once people start reducing wasteful standby electrical use,
they may pursue other opportunities to reduce their electricity consumption. In particular, immediate feedback can reinforce effective behavioral
changes. It appears that when consumers are provided with clear information
about energy consumption, they often change their behavior to reduce their
environmental impact and to save money. A number of studies have found
that when people have easy access to real-time measurements of their energy
use, they cut their use by 5 to 15 percent," 7 which corresponds to 0.36 to 1.1
tons of CO2 per household per year. If one-third of U.S. households adopted
real-time energy monitoring and reduced energy consumption by 5 to 15
percent, this would reduce CO2 emissions by 16 to 48 million tons per year
in the United States.

(describing power supplies that reduce standby consumption tenfold while only adding pennies
to the retail cost).
135.
Dave Waller, Greening Your Mobile, MANAGEMENT TODAY, Apr. 1, 2007, at 14; see also
Nokia Launches Mobile Phones With Energy-Saving Alerts, TELECOMMWORLDWIRE, May 10, 2007.
136.

See supra note 122.
See SARAH DARBY, ENVTL. CHANGE INST., OxrORD, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FEEDBACK ON
ENERGY CONSUMPTION: A REVIEW FOR DEFRA OF THE LITERATURE ON METERING, BILLING, AND
DIRECT DISPLAYS 3 (2006); Tsuyoshi Ueno et al., Effectiveness of an Energy-Consumption Information
System on Energy Savings in Residential Houses Based on Monitored Data, 83 APPLIED ENERGY 166, 181

137.

(2006) (concluding that real-time feedback helped users to cut household power use by 9 percent
through measures such as unplugging appliances or manually putting them into low-power modes);
see also Steve Lohr, Digital Tools Help Users Save Energy, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at

Cl (reporting on results of a study in Seattle, Washington, that found a 10 percent reduction in
household utility bills following installation of devices that allow household monitoring and
adjustment of electricity use).
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Home energy monitoring devices are commercially available for
$30 to $300 depending on the range of features.'38 Many utility companies
subsidize the purchase or offer monitors free to their customers as part
of time-of-use billing or other programs to manage demand during peak use
periods. 9 Other entrepreneurs are promoting extremely sophisticated (and
much more expensive) approaches to home energy monitoring that provide detailed information about energy use on a per-room or even a
per-appliance basis. 40
If a system purchased and installed for $300 allowed a homeowner to
reduce household electricity consumption by 10 percent, the system would
repay the initial investment in slightly more than three years.' 4' The cost
of the meter could be amortized over three years at an annual cost of $100.
The $100 would be offset by $96 in annual electricity savings if the
household achieved a 10 percent cut in use, so the net cost of 0.7 tons of
annual CO 2 reduction would be $4 per year, or $6 per ton. If the meter
functions well beyond the three-year payback period, the net cost per ton will
be significantly negative. If one-third of U.S. households participated in a program such as this, the total emissions reductions
(10 percent from one-third of
41
tons.'
million
31
be
would
households)
To overcome the differential accounting anomalies that deter individuals from purchasing such devices, a public program operated in partnership
with electric utilities might supply electricity monitors on a rent-to-own
basis with the payments charged to consumers' power bills. In this way,
consumers could see the cost of the meter being repaid by lower electric
bills. In addition, just as research on reducing automobile idling found that it
was most effective to combine public education with laws restricting
excessive idling, home electricity consumption may be most effectively
reduced when feedback on consumption is combined with tangible rewards
138.
See DARBY, supra note 137, at 11; see also Power Meter Store, Power Use Monitors,
http://www.powermeterstore.com/c550/power-usemonitors.php (listing current U.S. prices).
139.
Rebecca Smith, Lettingthe PowerCompany Control Your AC, WALL Sr.J., Jul. 10 2007, at DI.
140.
See Sharon Simonson, Utility Monitoring Adds Up Power of Information, SAN JOSE Bus. J.,
Aug. 31, 2007, at http://sanjose.bizjoumals.com/sanjose/stories/2007/09/03/story3.html; Agilewaves, Inc,
http://www.agilewaves.com (last visited July 15, 2008).
141.
The average household pays about $960 per year for electricity. See supra note 123. Ten
percent of the $960 per year ($96 per year) would repay a $300 investment in 3.1 years. For such
a short period, we neglect pure time preference, discounting of the future value of money,
and the inflation of electricity rates (in any event, the latter two would at least partially cancel each
other out).
142.
Total residential electricity use produces 935 million tons CO,. See GRG EMISSIONS
AND SINKS, supra note 122. If one-third of U.S. households reduced electricity consumption by 10
percent, this would reduce total emissions by 3.3 percent of 935 million tons, or 31 million tons.
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for achieving energy saving targets. A recent review of the literature suggests that there is a useful synergy in combining real-time feedback with
well-defined goals and tangible rewards for meeting those goals."'
In sum, if we assume that expenditures of $100 million for some mix of
subsidies and other targeted interventions will induce 33 percent reductions
in standby power use, and that one-seventh of the cost of the general public
information campaign attributable to this intervention is $114 million,
then the total out-of-pocket government cost is $214 million. If the resulting
emissions reductions are 16 to 22 million tons, then the cost to the government per ton of CO 2 reduced are $10 to $13. The aggregate annual savings
to households from reduced energy use are $2 to $3 billion, however. As a
result, the total out-of-pocket government cost of $214 million would be
significantly less than the total savings of $2 to $3 billion per year; the
program would reduce CO 2 emissions by millions of tons at a significantly
negative net national economic cost.
3.

Accelerate Adoption of CFL Bulbs

The individual action that has attracted perhaps the greatest attention
to date is the purchase and substitution of compact fluorescent light bulbs
(CFLs) for the common incandescent light bulbs (ILs) in homes.' 4 Our
analysis supports this focus on CFLs; CFL substitution is certainly one of the
easiest and most effective actions that individuals can take to reduce CO 2
emissions. Further, the retail industry has joined the substitution campaign enthusiastically. For example, Wal-Mart set a goal of selling
100 million CFLs in 2007 and ultimately surpassed its goal.145 Government
programs also promote substitution, including the well-publicized "Change
a Light, Change the World" program,146 and the "18seconds.org"
campaign. ' Legislation to ban ILs has been adopted in other coun-

143.
See G. Wood & M. Newborough, Energy-Use Information Transfer for Intelligent Homes:
Enabling Energy Conservation With Central and Local Displays, 39 ENERGY & BUILDINGS 495, 498
(2007) (noting that adding reward, either as a small monetary rebate or feedback emphasizing savings
in electricity bills, can cut energy consumption by up to 19.4 percent).
144.
See Charles Fishman, How Many Light Bulbs Does it Take to Change the World? One.
And You're Looking at It, FAST COMPANY, Sept. 2006, at 74.
145.
See Wal-Mart, Press Release, Wal-Mart Surpasses Goal to Sell 100 Million Compact
Fluorescent Light Bulbs Three Month2 Early (Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://www.walmartfacts.con/
articles/5328.aspx.
146.
See ENERGY STAR, ENERGY STAR Change a Light Change the World Campaign 20072008, http://energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=change-light.changealight index (last visited July 14, 2008).
147.
See 18Seconds, http://www.18seconds.org (last visited June 15, 2008).
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tries,"' and recently enacted federal energy legislation will phase out
most ILs and other inefficient bulbs by 2014.149
CFL substitution is attractive from numerous perspectives. Household
lighting
150 is responsible for about 70 to 160 million tons of CO, emissions per
year.
About 90 percent of household lighting is performed by ILs, which
convert only 5 percent of their input power to visible light.151 CFLs typically
consume only 25 percent-as much electricity as an equally bright IL. 52
Thus, replacing all residential ILs with CFLs has the potential to reduce
CO 2 emissions by roughly 50 to 120 million tons per year at negative net
153
cost to consumers.
According to industry figures, roughly 3.1 billion light bulbs are in use
in U.S. households today.'54 The amount of CO 2 emissions saved by changing a single light bulb depends on how many hours per day that bulb is

148.
For example, Australia, Cuba, Ireland, and Venezuela have pending bans on incandescent
light bulbs. See Energy Efficiency Lighting: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Res.,
110th Cong. 23-35 (2007) (statement of Paul Waide, Senior Policy Analyst, Energy Efficiency and
Environment Division, International Energy Agency, Paris, France).
149.
H.R. 6, 110th Cong. § 321 (2007) (providing that incandescent light bulbs will be phased
out over a two-year period from 2012 to 2014, and that by 2014 a minimum energy-efficiency standard will apply to almost all general purpose lighting).
150.
Annually, 101 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) of energy are consumed to produce
residential lighting; this amounts to 8.8 percent of household electricity use. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
U.S. HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICITY REPORT, fig. US-1 (2005), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/reps/enduse/
er01_ustabl.html. Using the conversion factor of 1.35 pounds of CO2 emissions per kWh
of electricity, we calculate CO, emissions due to residential lighting of 68 million tons. See DOE,
EPA, CO2 FROM ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 122. An alternate calculation gives a larger figure
of 156 million tons. See supra note 43.
151.
Jeff Johnson, The End of the Light Bulb, 85 CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Dec. 3,
2007, at 46, 49.
152.
Press Release, Dep't of Energy & Envt'l Prot. Agency, EPA and DOE Spread a Bright
Idea: Energy Star Light Bulbs Are Helping to Change the World, (Jan. 15, 2008), available
at http://www.doe.gov/news/5825.htm (noting that "Energy Star qualified [compact fluorescent
light bulbs (CFLs)] use about 75% less energy and last up to ten times longer than incandescent
bulbs"); see also ENERGY STAR PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS FOR CFLS (2003), available at
http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/product specs/program-reqs/cfs-prog-req.pdf (containing detailed
energy efficiency requirements for Energy Star ratings for CFLs).
153.
Household lighting produces roughly 70 to 160 million tons of CO2 per year. See ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN., supra note 122. Switching to CFLs would reduce this by 75 percent, or roughly 50
to 120 million tons. EPA reports that using CFLs in place of ILs used as little as 15 minutes per day
will pay back the cost of the CFL in 3.6 years or less and yield a lifetime savings of $17 or more over
ILs. The more hours a light is used per day, the shorter the payback and the greater the net savings.
DEP'T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, LIFE CYCLE COST-ESTIMATE FOR ENERGY STAR
QUALIFIED COMPACT FLUORESCENT LAMP(S) (2008), http://www.energystar.gov/ia/business/
bulk-purchasing/bpsavings-calc/CalculatorCFLs.xls.
154.
See Energy Efficient Lighting for a Brighter Tomorrow Act of 2007 (S. 2017), Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., 110th Cong. 35-40 (2007) (statement of Kyle Pisto, VP of
Governmental Relations, National Electrical Manufacturers Association) [hereinafter Hearing].

Low-Hanging Fruit

1739

operated, the climatic conditions, 55 and the fuel source for the electricity
used by the bulb. Detailed studies of residential lighting find that around
one-quarter of household lights are used four or more hours per day, and that
the typical light that a consumer would replace with a CFL is a 75 watt
' Replacing this typical bulb with a CFL would
bulb used 6.7 hours per day. 56
reduce CO 2 emissions by about 190 pounds per year."'
Unlike many other emissions-generating technologies, light bulb
turnover is quite rapid. The common IL has a life of only 1,000 hours, so
CFLs can be substituted quickly, and they produce significant short-term
emissions reductions.' Further, CFL prices have dropped dramatically in the
past few years, and consumers are now able to purchase these bulbs for less
than $3 per bulb.'59 This means 6the
CFL payback to the consumer will occur
°
within months after purchase. 1
Despite all of these benefits and the recent federal law phasing out
many IL bulbs, 6' a substantial opportunity for emissions reductions remains.
Sales of CFLs have only recently taken off in the United States. The EPA
reports that 290 million CFLs were sold in 2007, doubling the volume sold
the previous year.' 62 Still, CFLs constitute slightly less than 20 percent of
all light bulb sales in the United States. Less than 10 percent of the 1.7
billion light bulbs sold in 2006 were CFLs (compared with 50 percent in
Germany and 80 percent in Japan). Many consumers in the United States
155.
In winter or in cold climates, waste heat from ILs contributes to space heating, so savings
from substituting CFLs would be partially offset by the increased load on the furnace. On the other
hand, in summer or in hot climates, IL waste heat is unwelcome, and substituting CFLs can have a
significant secondary impact in reducing the load on air conditioners. See, e.g., NICOLAS LEFEVRE
ET AL., INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, BARRIERS TO TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION: THE CASE OF COMPACT
FLUORESCENT LIGHTS 10 (2006).
156.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, RESIDENTIAL LIGHTING: USE AND
POTENTIAL SAVINGS tbls. 4.18-A.19 (1996) [hereinafter EIA, RESIDENTIAL LIGHTING].
157.
A 75-watt CFL bulb used year-round for 6.7 hours per day consumes 180 kilowatt hours.
The consumption of one kilowatt hour corresponds with the production of 1.35 pounds of CO,. See
supra note 122. Thus, on average a single CFL results in 250 pounds of CO, emissions each year.
Replacing the 75-watt IL bulb with an 18-watt CFL bulb would reduce CO, emissions by 75 percent,
or 190 pounds per year.
158.
See Fishman, supra note 144, at 76 (approximately 40 percent of the light bulb stock is
changed in a year).
159.
See Johnson, supra note 151, at 48. Wal-Mart currently sells brand name CFLs for as
little as $1.65 per bulb. See Wal-Mart, GE CFL Light Bulb, http://www.walmart.com/catalog/
product.do?productid=5650617 (last visited July 14, 2008).
160.
ENERGY INFo. ADMIN., supra note 156, at 13, fig. 3.2 (concluding that a $22 CFL would
repay its purchase price in about 18 months at $0.10 per kilowatt hour, so a $3 CFL at $0.09 per
kilowatt hour would repay its purchase price in less than three months).
161.
See supra note 149.
162.
Press Release, supra note 152.
163.
See Hearing, supra note 154, at 35 (testimony of Kyle Pister).
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still choose ILs at $0.50 a bulb instead of paying $3 per bulb for CFLs,
despite the fact that the CFL will typically reduce electric bills by around
$12 per year and avoid around $1.50 spent replacing an IL bulb three times
per year." Individuals are inordinately aware of initial costs but only vaguely
aware of the lifetime savings associated with GELs. 165 Moreover, CFLs are not
perfect substitutes for ILs. Most do not have dimmer capabilities; the color
of the light can vary significantly from ILs; CFL floodlights for recessed
ceiling fixtures can take several minutes to come to full brightness; and
CFLs contain minute amounts of mercury, necessitating special end-of-life
handling and disposal. 66' Some also claim that long CFL life projections have
yet to be borne out in practice. 167 This indicates that CFLs will continue to
require a concerted public campaign in order to encourage ongoing adoption.
Fortunately, a wealth of research exists on the barriers to CFL adoption
and the best practices for encouraging CFL adoption.'68 Important barriers to
greater CFL adoption include: lack of information about the quality of particular brands of bulbs; unavailability of CFLs;'69 comparatively high purchase
164.
Replacing a 75 watt IL that is on 6.7 hours per day with an equally bright CFL reduces
electricity use by 0.377 kWh per day (three-quarters of 0.075 kWh times 6.7 hours). At $0.09 per kWh,
see supra, note 123, this amounts to savings of $0.034 per day, or $12.4 per year. See EIA, RESIDENTIAL
LIGHTING, supra note 156, at 12 ("[A]n incandescent bulb lasts about 3.5 months.").
165.
See ENERGY STAR, Compact Fluorescent Light Bulbs, http://energystar.gov/
index.cfm?c=cfls.prcfls (last visited July 14, 2008) (noting that each CFL saves about $30 or more in
electricity costs over each bulb's lifetime).
166.
L.J. SANDAHL ET AL., PAC. Nw. LAB. REPORT # PNNL-15730, COMPACT FLUORESCENT
LIGHTING IN AMERICA: LESSONS LEARNED ON THE WAY TO MARKET 5.6-5.7 (2006); Blaie
Harden, Fluorescent Bulbs Are Known to Zap Domestic Tranquility, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2007, at
Al; EPA FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: INFORMATION ON COMPACT FLUORESCENT LIGHT
BULBS (CFLs) AND MERCURY (2008), available at http://energystar.gov/ia/partners/promotions/
changejlight/downloads/FactSheetMercury.pdf.
167.
Andrew C. Revkin, The Upside and Downside of Low-Energy Lighting, N.Y. TIMES blog site
(Dec. 7, 2007), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.conV2007/12/07/experiences-with-next-generation-lighting
(reporting that the author, a New York Times reporter, experienced a "huge variability in the
reliability of bulbs, with some CFLs burning out ridiculously quickly" in his home).
168.
See, e.g., KENNETH JAMES ET AL., PAC. GAS & ELEC., NATIONAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY
BEST PRACTICES STUDY: VOLUME Ri-RESIDENTIAL LIGHTING BEST PRACTICES REPORT
(2004); SANDAHL ET AL., supra note 166; LISA A. SKUMATZ & OWEN HOWLETT, FINDINGS AND
"GAPS" IN CFL EVALUATION RESEARCH: REVIEW OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE (2006),
http://mail.mtprog.conCD-Layout/Day_2_22.06.06/1 115-1300fiD19-Skumatz3_final.pdf; LEFEVRE,
supra note 155.
169.
CFLs have only recently become widely available at big-box stores, such as Home Depot,
and are even less available at supermarkets, where most light bulbs are purchased. SANDAHL ET AL.,
supra note 166, at 2.4 ("Americans typically purchase light bulbs at grocery stores; however, until
recently it was not likely that CFLs could be found there in any significant numbers or at competitive
prices."); id. at 2.8 ("Even in 2006 many grocery, drug, and small hardware stores carry only a
limited variety of bulbs." (citation omitted)); id. at 5.2 (reporting that in 2002, big-box stores had
recently begun to stock inexpensive CFLs as a standard promotional item).
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cost; undervaluing of savings in electricity costs; poor retail practices;' 70 and
skepticism about claims of energy savings, long life, and environmental
benefits.' In addition, Lisa Skumatz and Owen Howlett note that almost
half the benefit to the consumer of adopting CFLs may arise from benefits
other than reduced energy cost."' These benefits, which include personal
satisfaction and recognition by peers for caring for the environment, may
not be exploited 73fully by incentive campaigns that focus only on reducing
electricity bills.'
The most successful interventions have identified the important barriers to adoption by the target population and combined different approaches
to address consumers' objections or hesitance. A number of campaigns
between 2000 and 2002 focusing on reducing peak electricity load were very74
successful, producing benefits up to eight times the cost of the program.1
Serious limitations exist to these interventions, however. The programs targeted large numbers of households, with budgets ranging from $0.62 to $5.50 per
household, and induced 1 to 10 percent of those households to buy CFLs
during a given year."' Most of the calculated benefits from these programs
related not just to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, but to the reduction of load on strained electrical distribution systems (consumer savings on
electricity bills was not accounted for). 6 More recent programs to promote

170.
For example, failing to display and stock energy-efficient products in ways that make it
easy for interested customers to locate and select products.
171.
JAMES ET AL., supra note 168, at 19, exhibit R1-2; SANDAHL ET AL., supra note 166, at 2.1-2.9.
172.
SKUMATZ & HOWLETT, supra note 168, at 9 (noting that consumers value nonenergy
benefits up to 90 percent as much as the reduced electricity bills, so up to 47 percent of the total benefit is not cost driven).
173.
Id.
174.
Successful programs have used varied incentives, depending on the market, which include
rebates to consumers, coupons or free samples distributed to consumers, and rebates to retailers to
stock and sell CFLs. Best practices, as defined by a retrospective evaluation by JAMES ET AL., supra
note 168, exhibit R1-E2 at 4, include the use of multiple incentives, careful choice of incentives
based on market research, and careful performance monitoring to facilitate assessment and to reduce
free riding. Benefit/cost ratios ranged from 1.6 to 8.3. Id. at RI-37, exhibit R1-7. Higher scores are
better and a score of one corresponds to a neutral or indifferent outcome. GOVERNOR'S OFFICE
OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, STATE OF CAL., CALIFORNIA STANDARD PRACTICE MANUAL:
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEMAND-SIDE PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS 27 (2002) (describing benefitcost tests for reducing electricity demand).
175.
Id. at 12.
176.
If only the CO, reductions are counted, these interventions cost somewhere between $9
and $48 per ton of CO,, but this is a misleading figure because reducing CO, emissions was not the
goal of any of these programs. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 168, at 12. Program effectiveness was
measured in dollars per kilowatt hour reduced in the first year. The latter ranged from $0.06 to
$0.19. Id. at 37 exhibit R-7. Over the expected lifetime of the CFL (5.8 to 9.4 years, see supra note
167) the cost per kilowatt hour reduced falls to between $0.01 and $0.03. See id. at 12. One kilowatt
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CFL adoption have achieved much greater penetration. For example, a
program in British Columbia raised the fraction of households with at least
one CFL from 26 percent in May 2002 to 55 percent in January 2004. Additionally, utility-sponsored programs in Massachusetts and Connecticut
increased CFL sales by 670 percent between 2002 and 2005 and raised the
fraction of households with one or more CFLs to over 60 percent, although
further work is needed to increase the number of CFLs per household.'77
We believe that a new generation of national CFL promotion could
be significantly more cost-effective. First, the major barriers against which
previous programs have struggled-price and availability-have dropped
quite dramatically in the last few years. CFL prices have dropped from around
$6 per bulb at the time of the interventions studied (2000-2002) to around $2
today."8 Moreover, at the time of the studies, CFLs were much less widely
available at common retail outlets, while today they are readily available at
common big-box stores and are increasingly available even at supermarkets.'
The lower barriers, combined with effective use of lessons-learned from past
campaigns, suggests that a $100 million national campaign with a clear focus
on reducing greenhouse gas emissions rather than on peak load could be more
cost effective.
For example, if Wal-Mart is able to sell 100 million CFLs at around
$2.00 each, it must be able to do so while spending much less than one dollar
per bulb on marketing. If a $150 million public campaign, with a mixture
of publicity, consumer education, and incentives to retailers, were similarly
effective, it might be able to place 100 to 300 million bulbs in homes. CO2 emissions would thereby be reduced by 10 to 30 million tons per year." ° Estimates
of average CFL lifetime range from 5.8 years to 9.4 years in practice,'' so lifetime
hour of electricity produces, on average, 1.35 pounds of CO,, so we calculate $9 to $48 per ton. See DOE,
EPA, CO, FROM ELECTRIC POWER, supra note 122.
177.
SANDAHL ET AL., supra note 166, at 5.5-5.6. Detailed analysis of the cost-effectiveness of
these programs is not available.
SANDAHL ET AL., supra note 166, at 2.2 (concluding that the average price in 2003 was
178.
$6.00 per bulb, and that many consumers polled at the time cited $2.00 as a significant threshold
below which they would be much more eager to buy CFLs).
179.
Don Alaimo, Less Is More: Energy-Saving Compact Fluorescent Bulbs Are Helping Spark The
Lighting Category Along With High-End Decorative Specialty Products, SUPERMARKET NEWS, Oct. 2,
2006, at 49 (noting that "[in the past year, compact fluorescent lights have been a top growth area of
lighting for Price Chopper").
Because consumers preferentially replace heavily-used bulbs with CFLs, we adopt the U.S.
180.
Department of Energy's typical bulb for these calculations. See supra note 157 (noting that replacing
a typical 75 watt IL bulb with an 18 watt CFL bulb reduces CO, emissions by 190 pounds per year).
SKUMATZ & HOWLETT, supra note 168, at 7; LISA A. SKUMATZ & JOHN GARDNER,
181.
SKUMATZ ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON, REVISED/
UPDATED EULS BASED ON RETENTION AND PERSISTENCE STUDIES RESULTS 8-9 (2005) (concluding
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emissions reductions would be in the range 55 to 270 million tons, and the
cost effectiveness of the program would be $0.56 to $2.70 per ton.
In sum, if we assume that the out-of-pocket cost to the government for
subsidies to induce acceleration of CFL adoption by 100 to 300 million bulbs
is $150 million plus three-fourteenths of the cost of the public information
campaign ($170 million), then the total government cost is $320 million. If
the emissions reductions are 55 to 270 million tons over the lifetime of the
bulbs, the costs to the government per ton of CO2 reduced are $1 to $6 per

ton. The public would spend $200 to $900 million purchasing the CFLs
but would save $7.2 to $34 billion over the lifetime of the bulbs from reduced
energy use. 82 As a result, the total national cost of $520 to $1.2 billion would
be significantly less than the total national savings of $7.2 to $34 billion,
and the program would therefore reduce CO 2 emissions by hundreds of

millions of tons at a significantly negative net cost.
4.

Adjust Household Thermostat Settings Two Degrees in Summer
and Winter

The largest gains from heating and cooling will arise from replacing
existing equipment with new high-efficiency furnaces and air conditioners,
but such purchases require major financial outlays and hence cannot be
considered a low-hanging fruit option. Most households, however, can
simultaneously reduce CO, emissions and save money by making minor
thermostat adjustments in both winter and summer. As shown in Figure 1,
space heating and cooling is the largest component of household CO 2
emissions, and small changes therefore can produce appreciable results.
Indoor thermal comfort appears to be both a very personal and
culturally-determined preference." 3 International studies have shown, for
example, that citizens in countries with similar incomes and energy prices
choose strikingly different indoor temperatures in their homes." 8 Overall,
however, average indoor temperatures in winter have increased over time,

based on a review of 100 empirical studies that the lifetime of residential use CFLs should be revised upward
to 9.4 years for indoor use and 7.1 years for outdoor use).
182.
This results in a savings of $12.40 per year per bulb, $72 to $117 over the life of the bulb,
or $7.2 to $35 billion for 100 to 300 million bulbs (for example, $117 per bulb times 300 million is
$35.1 billion). See supra note 164.
183.
See NRC, HUMAN DIMENSION, supra note 13, at 47-48.
184.
ENERGY BusINESS INTELLIGENCE, E SOURCE SPACE HEATING ATLAS ch.2 (2004). To
illustrate, see infra notes 192-193, and accompanying text.
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probably due to a more sedentary lifestyle and a decreasing willingness to
use clothing as insulation in the winter.'
We believe a modest two degree Fahrenheit (F) change in ambient indoor
temperatures, combined with a more significant reduction in overnight
winter temperatures, does not constitute a significant lifestyle adjustment.
The range of annual savings derived from a two-degree F change in summer
and winter temperatures runs from 1,000 to 2,000 pounds of CO 2 per
household,'86 depending on the source of the energy used for home heating
and cooling, the efficiency of existing equipment, current temperature settings, and other factors. This temperature change could result in household
savings of as much as $125 per year without any offsetting financial costs.'87
Despite the clear financial gains that households can reap from pursuing
this option, there almost certainly will be some pushback from citizens who
have grown accustomed to existing temperature settings. Many older Americans
will remember the dismal results of President Carter's attempt to convince
the nation's citizens that they should turn down the thermostat and rely on
more layers of clothing. 88 Until perceptions shift in the general public about
the threat posed by climate change, actions that are seen as asking Americans
to sacrifice have uncertain prospects.
It is important, therefore, to launch an effort that combines an attractive informational component with some level of subsidy for the individual
household. This subsidy could come in the form of a $10 coupon for the
purchase of a programmable thermostat, or it could take the form of a coupon
for a meter that monitors household energy use. The programmable thermostat would be helpful in relieving daily attention to temperature setting.
Programmable thermostats can be purchased for as little as $50.9 Meters that
provide residents with quantitative evidence of energy use would be helpful
in providing important feedback to households. After all, monthly bills do
not provide real-time feedback, and research has shown that real-time feedback

185.

Id.

186.
For the 2,000 pounds per year calculation, see An Inconvenient Truth, Reduce Your Impact
at Home, http://www.climatecrisis.net/takeaction/whatyoucando (last visited July 14, 2008). The
1,000 pounds per year estimate is the result of calculations derived from data at GreenerChoices.org,
Solutions at Home, http://greenerchoices.org/globalwarmingathome.cfm (last visited July 14, 2008).
187.
This calculation assumes a 5 percent decrease in heating costs and a 10 percent reduction
in cooling costs, leading to reductions of $63 and $62, respectively. Nashville Electric Service, Pournotes,
August 2007.
188.
David Morris, Carter's Brave Vision on Energy, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Oct, 10,
2005, at AIO.
189.
See Five Ways to Go Green From A] Gore, CNN.COM (Aug. 24, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/

2007/LIVING/wayoflife/08/23/o.green.gore/index.html.
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can result in energy savings of 5 to 15 percent."9 Meters that not only measure
electricity use, but also natural gas use, are not yet available on the consumer market, but they are being installed by some utilities, as well as being
developed for consumer use. 9' If we assume that 10 million households will
take advantage of the offer, the cost will be $100 million.
Japan already has launched an effort to get citizens to change their
temperature settings. For the summer months, it has launched a "Cool Biz"
campaign imploring citizens and businesses to set their indoor temperatures
at 82 degrees F. 9 2 For the winter months, it has a "Warm Biz" effort designed
to induce temperatures to be set at 68 degrees F. This campaign is decidedly
more ambitious than the measure being advocated here, and it is too early to
say whether it is having the intended effect.' 93
We assume that the combination of the general public information
campaign and targeted subsidies will induce 33 percent of all households to
make the two degree change in their thermostat settings. This means that we
could expect to gain from 18.1 to 36.3 million tons of CO 2 emissions savings
from this measure.' 94 If we assume that the out-of-pocket costs to the
government for thermostat adjustment interventions are $100 million plus
one-seventh of the $1.5 billion cost of the public information campaign
($114 million), then the total cost is $214 million. If the emissions reductions are 18 to 36 million tons, the costs to the government per ton of
CO 2 reduced are $6 to $12. The aggregate savings to households from
reduced energy use are roughly $4.5 billion, however. As a result, the total
national economic savings are over $4 billion, or between $110 and $150 per
ton of CO 2 reduced.

190.
SARAH DARBY, ENWTL. CHANGE INST., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FEEDBACK ON ENERGY
CONSUMPTION 3 (2006).
191.
PAUL WRIGHT, INFORMA11ON TECHNOLOGY FOR THE SUPPORT OF BEHAVIOR CHANGE IN
ENERGY USAGE (2007).
192. The temperature-setting campaign is part of the Japanese government's effort to reduce
emissions from the individual and household sector. The effort is termed "Team Minus 6%" to
indicate that the goal is to reduce carbon emissions by 6 percent (equal to Japan's commitment
to the Kyoto Protocol). For a description of the program, see Press Release, Ministry of the
Env't, Gov't of Japan, Launching of National Campaign to Fight Global Warming "Team Minus
6%" (Apr. 28, 2005), available at http://www.env.go.jp/en/press/2005/0428b.html.
193.
The temperatures are clearly a source of discomfort for many Japanese. See Sebastian

Moffett, Japan Sweats ItOut as It Wages War on Air Conditioning, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2007, at Al.
194.
measure.
by 2,000
assume a

We assume that one-third of all U.S. households (36.3 million) will take the desired
If we assume a conservative 1,000 pounds of CO, in annual household savings, and divide
pounds to convert to tons, our resulting estimate is 18 million tons CO,of savings. If we
more aggressive 2,000 pounds per household, the result is 36 million tons.
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Decrease Water Heater Temperature

Although it receives less attention than other actions, reducing CO2
emissions associated with hot water heating is both very significant and easy
to accomplish. The fact that household water heaters are kept out of sight
may contribute to their relative neglect. Many hot water heaters are installed
with a default temperature setting of 140-150 degrees F, when in most cases
temperatures of 120 degrees F will be perfectly adequate to meet households'
"
' Individuals can adjust the temperature settings by themselves with
needs. 95
only a small time cost and without any financial cost. The financial savings
from reducing temperatures by 20 degrees F would be about $24 to $40 per
'
year per household. 96
Conservation advocates frequently suggest the purchase and installation
of an insulating blanket to surround the water heater,' 97 but upgrades in hot
water heater insulation in recent years have rendered blankets of little use
for models less than ten years old. 98 The expected lifetime of a water heater
is about 10 years; thus, the number of units requiring a blanket is diminishing
quickly, and we therefore did not include insulation in our selection of lowhanging fruit. CO2 emissions vary between electric and natural gas water
heaters, but a rule of thumb is that a setback of twenty degrees F could produce as much as 1,466 pounds of CO2 emissions reductions per year.199
For the purposes of this analysis, we assume that the combination of the
general public information campaign and targeted subsidies will induce 50
percent of U.S. households to take this action."re If half of all households
do so, we can anticipate CO2 emissions reductions of between 28 and 39 million
tons.2 ' The subsidies could take a wide range of forms. For example, in the
195.
Power Scoreboard, Reduce Your Energy Consumption, Twenty Things You Can Do to
Conserve Energy, http://www.powerscorecard.org/reduce-energy.cfm (last visited July 14, 2008).
196.
The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy claims that each 10F reduction
will save 3 to 5 percent of water heating costs. See American Council for an Energy-Efficient
Economy, Consumer Guide to Home Energy Savings: Condensed Online Version, http://www.aceee.org/
consumerguide/waterheating.htm. Average yearly energy costs vary according to region and technology,
figures provided by the Council, see id., lead to a ball park average cost figure of $400 per year. A 20'F
reduction, therefore, comes to between $24 to $40 in reduced costs.
See Five Ways to Go Green From Al Gore, supra note 189.
197.
198.
See GreenerChoices.org, supra note 186.
See id.
199.
200.
The recommended general public information campaign may need to include information
that calms public fears about running out of sufficient hot water, or the subsidy may need to be reduced
somewhat to pay for a separate, targeted public information campaign that addresses this concern.
201.
We assume that half of all U.S. households (roughly 55 million, see supra note 62) will
make this adjustment. If we conservatively estimate an annual savings of 1,000 pounds of CO2 per
household, we then multiply by 55 million households and convert to tons by dividing by 2,000
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event individuals do not feel confident making the changes themselves, a $5
subsidy could be provided to gas and electric utilities for every customer they
assist in making the change. If 20 million U.S. households (20 percent) opt
for this service, the total subsidy will cost the government $100 million.
In sum, if we assume that the out-of-pocket costs to the government
include $100 million for thermostat adjustment subsidies, plus one-seventh
of the cost of the general public information campaign ($114 million), then
the total cost is $214 million. If the emissions reductions are 28 to 39 million
tons, the costs to the government per ton of CO2 reduced are $6 to $8. The
aggregate savings to households from reduced energy use are from $1.3 to $2.2
billion, however. As a result, the total savings to U.S. households run from
$1 to $2 billion total, or between $25 and $70 per ton of CO 2 reduced.

6.

Maintain Recommended Tire Pressure in Personal Motor Vehicles

As noted previously, personal vehicle use produces roughly half of all
the CO2 emissions over which individuals have substantial, direct control. In
theory, then, large savings are available from measures directed at vehicle
use."' Unfortunately, this does not translate into a plethora of low-hanging
fruit actions, as we have defined them. Vehicle choices and vehicle driving
styles are lifestyle decisions that will take considerable effort to alter, even
with rising fuel prices.0 3 In addition, vehicle driving style has become less,
not more efficient in recent years, even leading the EPA to revise its motor
vehicle fuel economy methodology. 2° Nevertheless, some individual actions
are relatively painless and produce measurable savings, and we discuss two:
tire pressure maintenance and, in the next subsection, air filter replacement.
The first of the two measures is simply to maintain tire pressure at
manufacturers' suggested levels. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates
that vehicle gas mileage improves an average of 3.3 percent by inflating tires

pounds. The result is 28 million tons. A more aggressive assumption of 1,400 pounds per household
brings the total to 39 million tons.
Indeed, many have claimed that the driver is the biggest factor in the fuel economy
202.
achieved by any vehicle. The U.S. Department of Energy asserts that aggressive driving can reduce
gas mileage by 33 percent on highways and 5 percent in cities. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, Driving
More Efficiently, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/driveHabits.shtml (last visited July 14, 2008). The
potential remedies, however, do not qualify as low-hanging fruit actions.
See DAVID GREENE & ANDREAS SCHAFER, REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM
203.
U.S. TRANSPORTATION 39 (2002).
See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 1, at 1727-28.
204.
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regularly to proper pressures.2 5 Tire gauges are inexpensive, and routine oil
changes often include tire inflation as a matter of course. The low-hanging
fruit action is simply to get the U.S. public to check and maintain tire
pressure on a consistent basis. A two-car family could save about $120 per
year by taking this action. 206
An effort will have to be mounted to increase public diligence in
making this change. It is clearly not a task citizens currently embrace,
considering the minimal attention required. In fact, studies suggest that
roughly one-third of all personal motor vehicles have tires that are not
inflated to recommended levels.2"7 We assume that the combination of the
general public information campaign and targeted subsidies will induce an
additional one-third of the personal motor vehicle fleet in the U.S. to be
maintained at proper tire pressure. For example, the subsidy could be in
the form of sending households a tire pressure gauge. If 50 million gauges are
distributed at a cost of $2 per gauge, the total cost will be $100 million. The
one-third increase in proper tire inflation would translate into CO savings
of 12 million tons.2 6
In sum, if we assume that the out-of-pocket cost to the government
for tire gauges is $100 million plus one-seventh of the cost of the public
information campaign ($114 million), the total government cost is $214 million. If the emissions reductions are 12 million tons, the cost to the
government per ton of CO 2 reduced is $18 for the first year of the program.
If we can reasonably assume that many drivers will continue to maintain their
tire pressure with little further incentive, however, the cost of the program,
averaged over several years, will be less than $10 per ton. The aggregate
savings to households from reduced energy use are $3.6 billion.2 9 As a result,
the total national savings are $3.4 billion, or $280 per ton of CO 2 reduced in
the first year alone, with additional savings accruing in future years.

205.
U.S. Dep't of Energy, Energy Saver Tips on Saving Energy & Money at Home: Driving
and Car Maintenance, http://www.eere.energy.gov/consumer/tips/driving.html (last visited July
14, 2008).
206.
This calculation assumes savings of 40 gallons per vehicle per year at $3.00 per gallon.
207.
Forty gallons is the difference between achieving an average gas mileage of 21 mpg and a
3.3 percent improvement (to 21.7 mpg). This calculation is based on the average U.S. household
travel mileage per year of 25,000 miles. We calculate the dollars figure by multiplying 40 gallons
times $3.00 per gallon of gas.
208.
Americans consume roughly 113 billion gallons of gasoline annually in light duty vehicles.
EIA, HousEHoLD VEHicLES, supra note 80. A 3.3 percent improvement in fuel efficiency would reduce
consumption by 3.7 billion gallons. We only assume one-third of the vehicles will maintain proper
pressure, so the savings amount to 1.2 billion gallons saved, equivalent to 12 million tons of CO 2.
209.
This calculation assumes 1.2 billion gallons of fuel saved at $3 per gallon.
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Change Air Filters in Personal Vehicles at Recommended Intervals

Few drivers perceive significant benefits from replacing automobile air
filters, but replacing clogged filters can improve vehicle efficiency, lengthen
engine life, and consequently save the owner money. Specialists recommend
air filter changes every 12,000 to 15,000 miles, but it is doubtful that most
drivers follow this schedule. ° Changing an air filter is quite simple and can,
in most cases, be done by the owner. Or the owner can have the filter
replaced when periodic oil changes are required.
In most cases the purchase of an air filter from an auto supply store will
run from $15 to $50, and we have assumed a midrange $30 price for our
analysis. 21' Gasoline savings alone from changing an air filter at the recommended interval total about $240 per year. 2 As a result, it is cost effective
for the individual to maintain a regular schedule for changing filters.
Periodic air filter changes can save the vehicle owner anywhere from 7
to 10 percent in fuel mileage.1 3 This measure also can result in substantial
CO 2 emissions savings. In fact, even if remedial measures only result in an
additional one-fourth of all vehicles having their filters changed on an annual
basis, 19 to 27 million tons of CO 2 will be saved. 4
Despite the favorable economics, the public has demonstrated considerable lethargy when it comes to this measure. We assume that an ambitious
public information campaign combined with a subsidy could enlist vehicle
owners to service a quarter of all registered vehicles. A subsidy could occur
in the form of a coupon that provides a $5 reduction in the price of what
would otherwise be a $30 purchase. If coupons are used for 20 million filter
purchases, the resulting cost would be $100 million.
In sum, if we assume that the out-of-pocket cost to the government for
air filters is $100 million plus one-seventh of the cost of the public information
The frequency is roughly once a year for most vehicles. Scott Memmer, How To Change
210.
Your Car's Filters, http://www.edmunds.conVownership/howto/articles/43786/article.html (last
visited July 14, 2008).
See Race Pages, http://www.racepages.com/parts/air-filter.html (last visited July 14, 2008).
211.
The practice should save a two-car family 80 gallons per year, or $240 at $3 per gallon.
212.
Eighty gallons is the difference between achieving an average gas mileage of 21 mpg and a 7 percent
improvement (to 23 mpg). This calculation is based on the average U.S. household mileage per year
of 25,000 miles. We calculate the dollar figure by multiplying the 80 gallons times $3 per gallon.
213.
The U.S. Department of Energy claims that this habit will save up to 10 percent in gasoline
mileage. See U.S. Department of Energy, Keeping Your Car in Shape, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/
feg/maintain.shtml (last visited July 14, 2008).
214.
A 7 to 10 percent reduction by one-fourth of all households of the 113 billion gallons
consumed annually in personal driving would save 2.0 to 2.8 billion gallons of fuel per year,
equivalent to 19 to 27 million tons of CO,. See EIA, HOUSEHOLD VEHICLES, supra note 80.
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campaign ($114 million), the total government cost is $214 million, or
$8 to $11 per ton of CO2. We assume the net annual savings per household
to be $190 ($240 in fuel savings minus $50 for the cost of two filters). The
aggregate savings to participating households from this measure over five years
are over $5 billion per year. As a result, the total national savings over five
years are roughly $25 billion, or $925 per ton of CO2 reduced.
C.

Potential Aggregate Emissions Reductions

1.

Total Emissions Reductions

Table 2 combines the quantitative results from our analysis of seven
low-hanging fruit actions individuals can take to reduce CO2 emissions. 215
The results range from a low of 111 million tons of emissions savings to a
high of 182 million tons of emissions savings. If we take the mean of these
two figures, we reach 147 million tons, which is a good match to the 7-in-5
target of 150 million tons. In other words, public behavior change regarding these seven measures stands a reasonable chance of meeting the ambitious
target. It is also important to re-emphasize that the maximum values seen
in Table 1 are not the results that would be obtained through full (100 percent) public behavior change. They are simply the results derived from
plausible levels of participation in a voluntary program-in many cases, no
more than a third of all households.
TABLE 2: ESTIMATED RANGE OF EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS

Measure

1.Reduce Idling
2. Reduce Standby Power
3. CFL Substitution
4. Two Degree Temperature Change

Low*
6
16
12
18

High"
9
22
37
36

5. Water Heater Temperature Changes
28
39
6. Tire Pressure Maintenance
12
12
7. Auto Air Filter Changes
19
27
Totals
111
182
Numbers are in millions of tons CO, rounded to the nearest million.

In short, if started in 2009, the limited set of low-hanging fruit measures
outlined in this Article can reasonably be expected to generate annual
215.
One European study puts the range of negative marginal costs for several of the chosen
measures at 10 to 90 euros per ton. VATTENFALL, supra note 31, at 6.
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reductions in the neighborhood of 150 million tons of CO2 by 2014. These
emissions reductions would amount to roughly 7 percent of the total U.S.
annual individual and household emissions as of 2005. The discussion above
illustrates, however, that many of the individual and household emissions
trends are heading in the wrong direction. Examples include increasing
emissions attributable to aggressive driving habits, temperature settings
for indoor heating and cooling, and electronics standby power use. 216 Thus,
the emissions reductions we identify here are all the more important
because the business-as-usual baseline looks grim in the absence of law
and policy interventions.
2.

Comparison to Other Targets

The magnitude of the 150 million ton reduction compares favorably to
a number of benchmarks, both in terms of the volume and the speed by
which they are accomplished. As mentioned at the outset, the reductions
constitute 47.7 percent of the annual CO2 emissions by the petroleum refiners in the United States and almost three times the CO 2 emissions generated
annually by the aluminum industry."' The reductions also are roughly equivalent to the emissions from 26 million automobiles or 54 large power plants.218
The emissions reductions also compare favorably to the emissions
reductions provided for in the leading academic and federal legislative
emissions reduction proposals. In the academic literature, Pacala and
Socolow have proposed a stabilization wedge concept for examining global
emissions reductions. Pacala and Socolow argue that given the projected
business-as-usual growth in CO2 emissions on a global level, reductions of
seven billion tons of carbon (which is equivalent to roughly 3.7 billion tons
of C0 2) will be required to stabilize global emissions by 2054.2 9 They propose fifteen sets of actions that can be taken to generate a wedge (emissions
reductions that begin promptly and grow to a billion tons of carbon or 3.7
billion tons of CO 2 emissions in 2054). They note that on a global basis
seven of the fifteen wedges will be required to achieve a leveling off of
emissions at 2004 levels in 2054.220 After five years, a single stabilization
216.
See discussion supra notes 79 to 114 (idling), 202 (discussing trends in aggressive driving),
146 to 194 (indoor temperatures), and 115 to 143 (discussing trends in standby power use).
217.
SCHIPPER, supra note 22, at 4 tbl. L
218.
Calculations are derived from EPA, UNIT CONVERSIONS, supra note 23.
See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 24, at 968-70.
219.
220.
Although Pacala and Socolow provide for stabilization at 2004 levels in 2054, see id. at
968, rather than leveling off in the near term with 60 to 80 percent reductions by 2050, the
stabilization wedge concept can be adapted to account for the emerging consensus regarding the need
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wedge would reduce CO2 emissions by 370 million tons per year. The
measures proposed here would generate roughly 150 million tons and thus
would be equivalent to 40 percent of an emissions wedge in the short run.22 '
On the federal legislative level, the Lieberman-Warer Bill establishes
a near-term target of limiting CO2 emissions from regulated sources to 2005
levels by 2012.222 Given projected business-as-usual increases, this seemingly
modest requirement would require emission reductions of approximately
985 million tons of CO2 in five years.22 ' The low-hanging fruit described in
this Article could be implemented quickly and could account for 15 percent
of the total requirement. In comparison, the new Corporate Average Fuel
Economy (CAFE) standards recently enacted in the Energy Independence
& Security Act of 2007 are expected to produce annual reductions of roughly
210 million tons by 2020 and twice that by 2030.2' The low-hanging fruit
measures thus not only produce 75 percent of the 2020 reductions but do so
far more quickly.
11.

THE Low-HANGING FRUIT IN CONTEXT

The existence of large, prompt emissions reductions that on plausible
assumptions could be achieved at low cost raises an important question:
Why is the individual and household sector not the focus of substantial
interest by policymakers? One possible answer is that the reductions simply
do not exist at the magnitudes or costs estimated above in Part II. Our
analysis is a first, rough attempt to quantify the issue, and until a far more
detailed analysis is conducted it will not be possible to make these claims
with more certainty. We have made conservative assumptions at numerous
stages in the analysis, however, and it is more likely that we have erred on the
side of pessimism rather than optimism concerning the magnitude, speed,
and cost of the emissions reductions. We examine in this Part the potential
explanations for the lack of attention to individuals and households by
policymakers and the academy.
for a short-term target and a more aggressive long-term target than leveling off at 2004 levels in
2054. See James Hansen et al., Dangerous Human-Made Interference With Climate: A GISS ModelE
Study, 7 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISRY & PHYSICS 2287, 2303-07 (2007).
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222.
See America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 1201 (2007) (providing
5.775 billion CO equivalent allowances in 2012, the total emitted by the covered facilities in 2005).
223.
This estimate is based on Energy Information Administration's projected 1.2 percent
increase per year in U.S. CO, emissions. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK
2007 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2030, at 13 (2007).
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Policymakers

One possible reason for the lack of attention by policymakers is a lack
of information about the magnitude of individual and household emissions
and the reductions that can be achieved at low cost. This lack of awareness
may begin at the conceptual level. For more than thirty years, environmental
policymaking has focused largely on regulating large industrial sources, and
this focus has created a misperception that industrial regulation is the best,
if not the only way to address a wide range of environmental problems." 5
Given this framing, it is very difficult for policymakers to treat individual and
household emissions with the same amount of rigor and effort as industrial
emissions, even though the individual and household sector exceeds the
industrial sector in CO2 emissions in the United States.2 As a result, government reports tend to understate the contributions of individuals and
households; many agencies lack the expertise to address the sector; and at
least since the energy crisis of the late 1970s, minimal research has been con227
ducted to develop optimal policies for reducing emissions from the sector.
This lack of awareness may extend from the conceptual to the applied
level. The problem is not that information is unavailable. The seven measures highlighted above have not been discovered after many years of investigation. They are measures that are commonly listed among a host of activities
that individuals and households can take to reduce energy consumption,
reduce CO 2 emissions, and save money. These lists can be found at tens and
perhaps hundreds of sites on the Internet." 8 These lists are an important
signal of the types of actions that can be taken, but they are far too informal
and ad hoc to assist policymakers. The lists' recommendations are often
inconsistent and poorly documented. 229 The activities cited often include a
mix of things people can do easily, with some difficulty, or with great
difficulty. No systematic, rigorous effort has been made to assemble and
evaluate the most promising emissions reductions opportunities from the
individual and household sector.
Even those policymakers who understand the large emissions reductions
potentially available from this sector may be skeptical about the prospects
225.
See Vandenbergh, supra note 16, at 524-35.
226.
See discussion supra note 38 and accompanying text.
227.
See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 1, at 123 n.94 (quoting Paul Stem for the
proposition that the recent interest in energy behavior research after a lull of more than two decades
has been a "Rip Van Winkle experience").
228.
See, e.g., discussion supra notes 186-189.
229.
See, e.g., Padgett et al., supra note 70, at 66 (noting the comparative inconsistency and the lack
of transparency of ten online carbon calculators).
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of achieving such reductions. The success of information-based behavior
change efforts has varied widely, and skepticism abounds. The National
Research Council (NRC) has described many behavior change efforts as
"notoriously ineffective.""23 Perhaps most importantly, the NRC has noted
that although personal barriers to individual behavior change (for example,
steep discount rates) are important, the barriers to policymakers are equally
important. In particular, policymakers often fail to take advantage of the
best social and behavioral science when designing and implementing policies directed at individuals and households.23 ' Robert Cialdini has documented this reluctance in studies of information campaigns intended to reduce
the stealing of petrified wood.232 Although Cialdini was able to demonstrate
that a new message was far preferable to the one being used by the National
Park Service, the policymakers adopted the results from their own informal visitor surveys and did not change their approach to reflect the research results. 33
Informational strategies that take advantage of the best social and behavioral science can be very effective, however.3 In addition, policymakers
need not use informational efforts alone. The optimal mix of policy measures will vary based on the type of behavior at issue and other factors. The
important point is that many politically viable, low-cost interventions are
available, including simple education campaigns, financial incentives, technology mandates imposed on manufacturers, and modest regulations directed
at individuals.
An additional potential concern to policymakers is the out-of-pocket
cost to government. Although the total national economic cost of the lowhanging fruit interventions may be available at less than half of the costs of
efforts proposed or adopted at the federal, state, and local levels, what may
matter most to policymakers is who bears those costs. Many of the costs
of the proposed cap-and-trade system and other industrial measures will
be borne not by government, but rather by the regulated community.235 This
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NRC, DECISION MAKING, supra note 14, at 74.
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Id. at 74-78.

See Robert B. Cialdini et al., Managing Social Norms for Persuasive Impact, 1 SC. INFLUENCE
232.
3 (2006); see also Robert B. Cialdini, Basic Social Influence Is Underestimated, 16 PSYCHIOL INQUIRY 158,
159 (2005) (describing underestimation of the persuasive power of descriptive norms by policymakers).
233.
Cialdini et al., supra note 232, at 12. Although legitimate concerns exist about government use of propaganda, the kinds of informational measures discussed in this Article all include only
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234.
See discussion supranotes 73-78.
235.
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cost-shifting helps to obscure the total cost from the public and to shift
those costs to industry, at least at the outset.
In contrast, government typically bears the costs of public information
campaigns and subsidies. The magnitude of the costs thus may be more
transparent to the public. In addition, the public may bear the costs directly
in the form of higher taxes rather than indirectly through the increased cost
of goods, passed along by regulated industries. As a result, the savings (for
example, from reduced energy use) may be less obvious to the public than
the potential tax increases to pay for information campaigns and subsidies.
Although the issue of government-borne cost is important, the ultimate
savings to individuals and households are large, as are the net social benefits, suggesting that out-of-pocket government costs should not pose an
insurmountable barrier.
B. Academicians
For the academy, efforts to reduce emissions from individual and
household behavior present difficult challenges at the intersection of theory
and practice. In theory, price increases, whether driven by a carbon tax or
a cap-and-trade program, should drive consumer behavior in desired directions. If individuals respond robustly to price, then theoreticians can model
behavior with relative ease and can focus on setting the right price for
carbon-emitting behaviors. This theoretical approach is appealing in that
it allows the academy to give policymakers simple, understandable answers
when asked how to reduce emissions efficiently. " ' Under this approach, if
carbon taxes are politically radioactive, the second-best solution of reducing
individual and household emissions via the price increases that would follow
from a cap-and-trade program seems appealing.237
Yet numerous empirical studies demonstrate that in practice, limited
information, high transaction costs, and a wide range of behavioral phenomena limit the extent to which price alone affects behavior.238 In response, the
social sciences offer policymakers a veritable Tower of Babel. People act
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See, e.g., Approaches to Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
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Office), available at http:l/www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=8769&type= 1; see also Orszag, supra note 48.
237.
See Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments
Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 293-329; lan W.H. Parry, & Roberton C.
Williams 1I1, A Second-Best Evaluationof Eight Policy Instruments to Reduce Carbon Emissions, 21
RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 347, 347-73 (1999).
238.
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rationally. 239 But not always." 4 Framing information matters. 41 But which
frame matters most may be very context- and person-specifi. 2 4 2 The focus of
policies should be on the individual, the group,244 or some combination
of smaller and larger groups. 245 Social marketing works. 46 Except when it
does not.247 In the face of these conflicting messages, even if policymakers
are inclined to tackle individual and household emissions directly, it is not
surprising that they rarely do so.
Does this analysis suggest that the low-hanging fruit are not so low-hanging
after all? We think not. The seven actions identified in this Article can be
addressed promptly using existing knowledge and can yield prompt, large,
low-cost emissions reductions. To take full advantage of the emissions
reductions available from the individual and household sector over the longterm, however, the academy will need to mobilize in ways that are all too
rare.248 In particular, academicians will need to make sufficient sense out
of the multitude of behavioral theories and empirical studies to provide
policymakers with sound policy advice. In some cases, the attempt to do so
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will reveal the need for theoretical and empirical studies to fill substantial
research gaps.249 In others, it will require reconciling the results of the
complex mix of existing theoretical and empirical studies into a coherent,
accessible set of policy recommendations and convincing policymakers to rely
on the best social science, rather than on intuitions that are often flawed.
This work will be a challenge. It will require social psychologists and sociologists to engage productively with scholars in other social science disciplines
as well as scholars in law, policy, and business. It will require scholars from
many fields to focus their research on questions that may not be within their
comfort zone or that may not be of the most intrinsic interest. It also will require
that other scholars learn what economists have known for decades: To influence
policy, research has to generate concrete, simple, empirically supported,
actionable recommendations.
We see the early signs of a mobilization of academicians and policymakers
to address this problem. A recent conference brought together many leaders
from the academic and policy realms to discuss behavior and climate
change.25° We have formed a research network of environmental engineers
and scientists, social and behavioral scientists, and law and policy experts to
identify and to engage the most important questions about individual and
household emissions." ' Other initiatives, centers, and institutes around the
United States and the globe are working on various aspects of individual environmentally significant behavior.252 These early efforts are just beginning to
conduct basic and applied research and to communicate the results necessary
to enable policymakers to address the individual and household sector. If
the research focuses on the most pressing questions and the results are communicated successfully to policymakers, we are confident that the low-hanging
fruit we have identified here will only be the first of many actions to
reduce individual and household emissions.
249.
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CONCLUSION

In sum, we believe that the low-hanging fruit strategy advocated in this
Article has a reasonable chance of achieving the 7-in-5 target, whether
through a single, massive public information campaign or a combination of
measures. The effort also may help the general public recognize that it is a
key component of both the problem and the solution to climate change. Once
a sense of responsibility is fostered, individuals will increasingly seek out
opportunities to confront this issue, whether through direct, consumer, or
civic actions. Perhaps most importantly, this strategy may call attention to
the need for policymakers and academicians to address the individual and
household sector with the same vigor as other regulatory targets.
We are not advocating an exclusive focus on the individual and
household sector. We believe that it is critical that calls for an individual
and household response to climate change be simply one component of an
integrated and comprehensive policy response directed at all major sources.253
We also are not suggesting that informational efforts alone will achieve
the targeted reductions. We expect that the optimal policy measures for
addressing individual and household emissions will depend on the details
of the behavior and its context in people's lives. For some actions, simple
education campaigns may be most effective. For others, financial incentives
may prove most efficient. For others where economies of scale apply, technology mandates may work best, such as for the adoption of automatic
idle-stop devices to address personal motor vehicle idling.
The federal government appears to be only a few years away from
forging a comprehensive emissions reduction program based on a cap-andtrade framework, and many states and local governments are far ahead of
the federal government. Direct efforts to reduce emissions from individuals
and households do not appear to be a typical focus, and yet the individual and household sector has much to contribute to reaching emission
reduction goals. We see no reason for keeping individuals on the sidelines.
An individual and household effort easily could be incorporated into federal, state, and local responses to climate change and may generate large
reductions in less time and at lower cost than many of the other measures
currently under consideration.
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